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The July 7, 2005 attacks on London inescapably direct public attention to our own
transportation system. But eventually – as happened after the Madrid bombings in 2004
– public vigilance will wane. This can be seen as an a⇥rmation of the profound trust
Americans place in their public safety professionals. It is also the natural dynamic of the
Issue Attention cycle, in which certain issues follow a predictable five stage process: pre-
problem, alarmed discovery, awareness of the costs of making significant progress, gradual
decline of intense public interest, and a post-problem stage. Before the London attacks,
Homeland Security was on the cusp of the fifth and last stage. Unless the U.S. is attacked
again, we will continue into Stage Five once the waves from the London bombing recede. In
the absence of an active national consensus that terrorists are a clear and present threat to
the lives of average Americans, the dynamics of the Issue-Attention Cycle are as inevitable
as the seasons.
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The July 7, 2005 attacks on London inescapably direct public attention to our own 
transportation system.  Everyone getting on a bus or train will look a little more carefully 
at objects that seem out of place or at people who look a bit suspicious.  Public officials 
will call for more equipment, more people, and more spending for transportation security.  
It happened in the U.S. after the Madrid bombings in 2004.  But eventually – as also 
happened after Madrid – public attention and vigilance will wane.  Transportation 
security advocates will again have to battle for resources against competing homeland 
security interests.  
The attacks in Madrid and London illustrate Homeland Security’s slide from the apex 
of the national domestic policy agenda into the mundane world of grants, bureaucracy 
and interest groups.  But this is not a bad thing.  It is an affirmation of the profound trust 
Americans continue to place in their public safety professionals.  It is also the natural 
dynamic of the Issue-Attention cycle.
More than 30 years ago, Anthony Downs wrote about a cycle that affects many domestic 
public policy problems.1  Downs argued that certain issues follow a predictable five stage 
process: pre-problem, alarmed discovery, awareness of the costs of making significant 
progress, gradual decline of intense public interest, and the post problem stage.  Before 
the London attacks, homeland security was on the cusp of Stage Five.  After the attacks, 
it revisited Stage Two.  Before too many months pass, it is likely to recall the difficulties 
of Stage Three, make a brief return trip through Stage Four, and – if there are no more 
attacks – settle into Stage Five.
We have been at war with the terrorists since September 11, 2001.  They have been at 
war with us since October 23, 1983, when 241 U.S. service members were killed in 
Lebanon.  During the almost 20 years before the nation formally joined the Terrorism 
Wars, homeland security was in Stage One of the Issue-Attention Cycle: the pre-problem 
stage.  A relatively small group of people were alarmed by the rising threat of terrorism.  
As has been well documented in the post 9/11 era, most of those calls to pay attention 
were ignored.
After the pre-problem phase comes Stage Two: Alarmed Discovery and a euphoric 
enthusiasm to do something quickly about the problem.  Alarmed Discovery is triggered 
by an especially dramatic event, such as September 11th.  At this point, the rest of the 
nation discovers – or in the case of the London bombings, recalls – the problem.  Political 
leaders rise up to demand and to oversee an immediate solution.  They are driven by a 
can-do ethos that asserts no problem is too big or complex to be solved.  We just need to 
get the right people working together as a team, come up with a plan, and simply fix the 
problem.  Stage Two of the Cycle is characterized both by shock and by the unyielding 
confidence that we can do something to right the wrongs that allowed the problem to 
happen.
After September 11th, we saw the largest reorganization of the national government in 
over half a century.  We allocated rivers of money to homeland security, even taking 
away funds from other public safety programs.  Interestingly, very few states and cities –
with the notable exceptions of New York City, Washington D.C., and a few other cities –
made such dramatic structural or resource changes.  This was an early signal that perhaps 
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most of the country is not as concerned about homeland security as are the jurisdictions 
with the most vulnerable targets
In Stage Three of the Cycle, there is a growing awareness of the costs of making 
significant progress.  The nation has not been attacked in almost four years.  We have 
spent more than 100 billion dollars on homeland security.  Hundreds of thousands of 
people have now added “homeland security” to their job responsibilities.  
Even so, books, articles and reports continue to point out how vulnerable our borders, 
ports, transportation systems, schools, public health, food supply, chemical industry, and 
infrastructure are to terrorist attacks.  Our spending and our programs focus mostly on 
preparing to respond more effectively and efficiently to the next attack.  We still do not 
have a national plan to prevent terrorism.  We do not even have a shared vocabulary for 
prevention.
The executive branch of the national government is embarking on a multi-year effort 
to convince states and cities to obey the expanding dictates of Homeland Security 
Presidential Direction (HSPD) 8 if they want to continue to receive homeland security
funding.  More than one city is quietly doing the benefit cost analysis to determine 
whether getting homeland security money is worth the organizational and other costs to 
satisfy grant requirements.  State legislatures are becoming aware that the national 
government expects them eventually to pick up a substantial share of homeland security 
spending.  The private sector continues to balk at systematically collaborating with 
government to reduce critical infrastructure vulnerabilities.  These are all Stage Three 
artifacts of the Issue-Attention cycle. 
By Stage Four, the public – including public leaders – gradually loses interest in the 
problem.  Some people become discouraged about how long it is going to take to “solve” 
the problem.  Others become bored with it or move on to other, more immediately 
pressing, concerns.  
There is substantial evidence that public interest in the terrorism problem has waned 
since 2001.  In October 2001, 85% of Americans thought the next attack was imminent.  
In June 2005, a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll reported that 64% of Americans believed 
we would not be attacked anytime soon.
Most Americans have little concern that they or their families will be victims of 
terrorism.  A January 2005 CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll found 90% of adults believed 
the chances of a terrorist attack in their community was “not too likely,” or “not at all 
likely.”  In a May 2005 CBS poll, only 7% of adults nationwide thought terrorism was 
the most important national problem.  A June 2005 ABC News/Washington Post poll 
reported only 12% of adults in the country believed the U.S. campaign against terrorism 
should be the top priority for the Bush Administration.  The economy, the Iraq war, 
health care, and social security all ranked higher.  Of the college seniors and graduates 
surveyed in 2005, only 13% were afraid of terrorism.  Significantly larger majorities 
feared going into debt and being unemployed.2
Stage Five of the Cycle is the Post Problem Stage.  The issue moves behind the public 
scenes and becomes the grist for homeland security’s congressional, industrial, academic,
and bureaucratic Complex.  The professionals who populate that Complex develop and 
refine the strategies, programs and institutions formed in response to Alarmed Discovery.  
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Before July 7, 2005 we were on the cusp of Stage Five.  Unless the U.S. is attacked 
again, we will continue into Stage Five once the waves from the London bombing recede.   
The American public is generally comfortable with the amount of attention government 
gives to homeland security.  More than half the adults polled in a May 2005 NBC 
News/Wall Street Journal survey thought the national government was placing just the 
right amount of emphasis – not too much, not too little – on both homeland security and 
terrorism.
There are several reasons why a diminished public interest in homeland security is not a 
problem.  For one thing, in the absence of an active national consensus that terrorists are 
a clear and present threat to the lives of average Americans, the dynamics of the Issue-
Attention Cycle are as inevitable as the seasons.  Homeland security has matured 
sufficiently to join the routine of public policy.  
There is no particular reason why homeland security has to be the number one priority 
for America.  Half the American people polled in the summer of 2004 thought we were 
safer now than we were on September 11th.  Half thought we were not.  
Clearly there are some states and cities where the threat of terrorism is not a 
theoretical exercise.  They have people living in their communities who wish harm to our 
nation.  They house targets which if attacked could kill hundreds of thousands of people 
or cause massive disruptions to the national economy.
But there are other communities where tornadoes, hurricanes, gangs, or 
methamphetamines are more immediate threats.  In a world where you cannot do 
everything, these communities have chosen – by how they spend their money and 
attention – to manage the risks they can do something about, and to accept the risk of Al
Qaeda-style and domestic terrorism.  In the absence of any additional terrorist attacks, 
expect to see more communities join this group.
At a Spring 2005 conference of state legislators and judges, only two out of forty 
public officials attending a homeland security panel indicated that homeland security was 
one of their top concerns.  As one legislator said, they have faith that the public safety 
professionals charged with securing the homeland are doing their jobs.  “If they’re not,” 
he said, “then we need to get people in there who will.” 
One recent June evening, Interstate 5 near the bucolic and largely unpopulated 
California-Oregon border was shut down for several hours.  Someone had reported a 
suspicious box by the side of the freeway, under the “Welcome to California” sign.  The 
box turned out to be the cremains of an unknown person – ghastly enough, but nothing 
worse.  This very minor incident involved the citizen who reported the box, law 
enforcement agencies, and other public safety agencies from two states that responded, 
collaborated, and communicated to resolve the issue.  In the pre-September 11th world, it 
is likely the box would have stayed unnoticed until the next time the highway was 
cleaned.  
Today, all over the country, agencies that had no history of working together are 
creating a new history.  Government and private sector workers are more attuned to what 
is around them.  Law enforcement officials who complained about never getting any 
information are now complaining about getting too much.  That is progress.
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We have only begun this epochal marathon called homeland security.  There is much 
to criticize about the pace, philosophy, and means of making the nation safer.  In a sense, 
it is disappointing that we need an attack on British subways and busses to generate more 
attention for our own transportation system.  Homeland security has lost its prominence 
as an issue that rivets the imagination of an easily distracted public.  But the terrorist 
threat remains real.  And the magnitude of the work that remains to be done grows 
geometrically as knowledge about our vulnerabilities increases.
The Issue-Attention Cycle continues. The post problem stage of the Cycle becomes 
Version 2.0 of a new pre-problem stage.  Anyone paying attention can hear homeland 
security specialists worrying about ports, public health, food supply vulnerabilities, and 
more.  
The country will be attacked again – next month, next year, or in the next decade.  
After the Alarmed Discovery that follows the attack, there will be another period of 
“euphoric enthusiasm” to dramatically change what we are doing now.  
Here is where homeland security’s issue-attention cycle may depart from the conceptual 
template.  Some of the “dramatic changes” that follow a horrendous attack could reshape 
forever, and in historically undesirable ways, the American ethos.  It is the job of 
homeland security professionals to prevent that next attack.  When the attack does 
happen, their job will be to remedy what has not worked.  It will also be to hold on to the 
ideals that make our nation a unique experiment in world history.
Prevention means more than just preventing the next attack.  It also means preventing 
the consequences of terrorism from turning us into the Lord of the Flies.  The path of that 
cycle is dark.
1Anthony Downs, “Up and Down With Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention Cycle,’" The Public Interest, 28 (Summer 1972): 
38-50.
2
 See summary of polling data at http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm.  Greg Toppo, “Graduates fear debt more 
than terrorism,” USA Today; May 19, 2005.
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The events of September 11, 2001 caused the nation’s leaders to accelerate existing
border programs aimed at prevention. Traditionally, the “prevention” of border viola-
tions has involved interdiction (physically impeding any incursion while it is occurring),
preemption (through routine screening to intercept illegal shipments, weapons, people,
or other illicit cargo), and deterrence (where an action taken means a potential violator
does not plan or even attempt an illegal entry). While e ective in some cases, none of
these strategies – together or separately – has evolved into a comprehensive, prevention-
oriented approach to border security. The development of a prevention-led border strategy
would involved at least four strategic shifts: aligning border security with global strategy;
forging a new foreign policy; making progress on cooperation; and changing U.S. reactive
approaches.
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Long before September 11, 2001 strategists recognized that prevention was a priority 
among concepts of national security.  Military strategy had generally accepted “forward 
deployment” of assets and influence as core tactics to deter opponents from taking 
aggressive actions and quickly interrupting them once they began.  Law enforcement 
strategy has developed more slowly in adopting a preventive approach.  Still, at least by 
the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the presidential directives of both Republican 
and Democratic administrations had ordered law enforcement agencies to deploy 
resources abroad to intercept and disrupt threats as far from the U.S. border as feasible.  
Under those directives, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA), and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), among other 
domestic law enforcement agencies, initiated overseas operations and deployments.
The events of 9/11 pushed prevention to new prominence in both military and civilian 
law enforcement strategies.  Forward deployment became active preemption, including 
regime change, as military forces landed in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Domestically, 
Congress rushed to create The USA PATRIOT Act, granting law enforcement authorities 
greater investigative powers to search and pre-empt a terrorist attack from within the 
United States.1  The Bush Administration revised its national security and 
counterterrorism strategies explicitly to elevate prevention to the Nation’s first priority.2
Despite the significance that Congress and the president attached to the concept, 
however, prevention remains one of the least understood dimensions of the Nation’s new 
security strategy.  Nowhere is this more evident than in the Nation’s efforts to transform 
its approach to border security.  Within two months of 9/11, the president issued 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive #2 (HSPD-2) seeking to strengthen and shift 
border security strategies.  The president returned to the topic of border security in at 
least three subsequent Presidential Directives.  Yet, the role of prevention in border 
security strategies remains elusive.  
The purpose of this article is to examine several of the primary border security reforms 
taken since 9/11 to understand and gauge progress toward making prevention the top 
priority.  Not surprisingly, the violation of border controls that made the 9/11 attacks 
possible caused the nation’s leaders to accelerate existing border program reforms.  The 
Presidential Directives served to a large extent to wrench current border projects that had 
stalled amidst the nation’s polarization over immigration policies from previous 
bureaucratic and political entanglements.  Still, few of these rescued border initiatives 
satisfied the compelling requirements that making prevention a national priority 
demanded.  
THE CHALLENGE
Post-9/11 border security strategies suffer from a familiar policy tale.  In recovering from 
a crisis, institutions try to correct mistakes that led to the earlier events, only to ignore the 
potential for future, somewhat different ones.  With the exception of a few illustrative 
initiatives, recent border security policies have attempted to accelerate and fully 
implement programs designed before 9/11.   Valuable in their own terms, when complete 
the projects may well help to solve problems with international travel, visa and 
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immigration policy, and crossborder commerce.  The question is whether they address the 
new risks and threats of the post-9/11 age of terror.
Given the nature of the 9/11 attack, and the weaknesses of border security that it 
exploited, moving first to close the obvious gaps in border security was entirely 
understandable.  These early steps, however, reinforced an earlier reactive orientation in 
border security policies and competed against proposals for more prevention-oriented 
reforms.  For example, HSPD-2, released on October 29, 2001, aimed at changing 
immigration policies by creating a capacity to deny entry, detain, prosecute and deport 
aliens associated with or suspected of engaging in terrorist activity.3
Federal agencies responded to the Directive by accelerating efforts to track, 
investigate, and prohibit activities inside the United States.  The Department of Justice set 
up the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force.  Border security agencies expanded their 
investigative participation in FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces.  The INS barred 
international students already studying in the United States from courses that involved 
sensitive material.  The Presidential Directive also urged agencies to develop and use 
advanced technologies to locate and apprehend suspected terrorists, or supporters of 
terrorism, inside the United States, even if existing legal restrictions on the use and 
analysis of data had to be overcome.  
At this early date, perhaps the only forward-leaning prevention initiative involved the 
Directive’s reference to developing “North American Complementary Immigration 
Policies.”  HSPD-2 called for immediate negotiations with Canada and Mexico “to assure 
maximum possible compatibility of immigration, customs, and visa policies.” The goal 
was to establish a North American screening perimeter in which border agencies from all 
three countries would use comparable, if not the same, standards for inspecting 
individuals seeking to enter the region.  Having secured the perimeter, subsequent action 
could facilitate movements across the two “internal” borders separating the United States 
from Mexico and Canada.
Although the direction was promising, the programmatic response was reserved and 
disappointing.  Border agencies crafted a Smart Border Initiative, which essentially 
repackaged a list of incomplete immigration and customs projects started in the 1990s 
and reset accelerated schedules for deployment.  The goal of most of the Initiatives’ 
specific projects was to strengthen or “harden” the physical and virtual borders between 
the United States and its two neighbors.  Little progress was made to standardize 
screening procedures among the three countries or even to begin to negotiate 
coordination of efforts.    
Part of the problem in beginning to transform border security strategies was due to 
ambiguities in defining prevention.  Prevention at the border called for tough choices 
about relationships with neighboring countries, which few were willing to take on in the 
absence of clearly defined goals and objectives.  Before 9/11, prevention at the border 
typically meant interdiction – searching, locating, and physically stopping an effort to 
cross or to carry something across the border.  Interdiction was the priority – physically 
impede any incursion while it was occurring.  Within a broader scope of prevention, 
however, interdiction represented only one of several ways in which attacks or illegal 
behavior could be stopped.
Prevention, for instance, also refers to preemption – detecting and stopping an attack 
before it is attempted.  In border security terms, active screening of information related to 
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travelers and cargo is a routine pre-emptive measure. For decades the U.S. Customs 
Service has employed cargo screening tactics as a way to intercept illegal shipments, 
weapons, people, or other illicit cargo within containers before they are shipped toward 
the United States.
Prevention at the border also refers to deterrence, although what is meant by 
deterrence has also been confusing.  Generally speaking, in border security terms, 
deterrence means that because of an action taken, a potential violator did not plan or even 
attempt an illegal entry.  Deterrence is by far the most valued form of prevention.  Yet 
few agencies embrace it fully because of the inherent difficulty of defining and 
measuring deterrence in tactical and operational terms.  The problem is not restricted to 
border agencies.  Law enforcement personnel across the globe face similar challenges.  
They struggle to find a way to demonstrate the effectiveness of a deterrence approach 
when what appears to be required is to show that an illegal act did not occur because of a 
law enforcement agency’s actions.  Does the fear of arrest and detention, for instance, 
deter someone from deciding to leave their home, pay a smuggler, and attempt to cross 
the border illegally?
Border security strategies, before and after 9/11, have involved some measure of each 
of these three dimensions of prevention.  Each has guided border security agencies 
toward different policy and operational outcomes.  Together or separately, however, none 
has evolved into a comprehensive, prevention-oriented approach to border security.  The 
discussion in the following sections highlights the limitations of each approach and 
identifies steps that could transform policies toward a more prevention-centric strategy.
Border Interdiction
In the early 1990s, the U.S. Border Patrol revised its strategic plan to emphasize a new 
objective -- “prevention through deterrence.”4  The new plan changed the strategic focus 
from a traditional policing model in which the object was to maximize the number of 
arrests of people who had already crossed the border illegally.  The new objective was to 
ensure that no one crossed the border in the first place, stopping them physically right at 
the border if need be, or inhibiting their attempts to cross by increasing the expectation 
among potential crossers that they would be caught immediately.  The intent was clearly 
to move away from a reactive, responsive-oriented approach toward a more pro-active, 
prevention strategy.
The new strategic plan began to change border control tactics.  The Border Patrol 
launched a series of highly-publicized border operations during the 1990s – Operation 
Hold-the-Line, Gatekeeper, Safeguard, etc. – which involved “forward deployment” of 
agents and equipment as close to the international boundary as feasible.  Rather than 
waiting for crossers to enter the United States and then physically interdicting them, the 
Border Patrol placed officers in high visibility locations close to the border, deployed 
lights in otherwise darkened areas that formerly were places of illegal entry, and
broadcasted publicly the intent to dismantle crossborder smuggling activities.
Although the difference between deterrence and interdiction was minimized by the 
short physical distance at the border between officers deployed close to the international 
line and the potential crosser in front of them, the changed tactics began to have visible 
impacts in the areas of high operational concentration.  Border Patrol apprehensions 
(“arrests”) declined, smuggling rings were visibly disrupted, community perceptions of 
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the safety of border neighborhoods improved, and local leaders increased their support of 
the security strategy.  The prevention orientation also reduced public perceptions of the 
prevalence of social disorder and chaos along the border.  In turn, improved security 
opened opportunities for greater cooperation among agencies across the border.
For instance, building upon the realities and perceptions of increased border security, 
the Border Patrol’s parent agency, the INS, was able to expand legal immigration 
initiatives.  It expanded and improved border infrastructure that expedited legal crossings 
and reduced the long lines of vehicles and pedestrians waiting at ports of entry for 
inspection.  The INS was also able to strengthen cooperation with Mexican and Canadian 
officials on these positive commercial initiatives and gain assistance on additional anti-
smuggling prevention measures.   
These prevention measures, however, stimulated criticism and opposition from diverse 
stakeholders.  One of the lessons learned from the general law enforcement community 
when it has tried to implement similar prevention measures is that opposition comes 
initially from those who believe the strategy is too weak as well as from those who 
perceive it to be too intrusive in community affairs.5  Hard-line opponents resist the 
concept that a decline in arrests can be a good outcome.  In contrast, some community 
activists believe that the Border Patrol has no business enforcing immigration laws 
anywhere except along the physical line of the border.
The public controversy about the border strategy became part of a general criticism of 
the performance of the INS and other border security agencies.  By 2000, the pace and 
effectiveness of the new Border Patrol strategy had slowed, having reached only the 
urban areas of El Paso, San Diego, Brownsville, and Nogales.  Although the new strategy 
was still in force, the execution of the strategy waned.  Previously disrupted smuggling 
rings retrenched in new areas along the border, cooperation with Mexico declined, and 
public support quieted.  Even before 9/11, long lines returned at the ports of entry and 
arrests of illegal crossers between the ports of entry increased as border agencies returned 
to old tactical habits.
After 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faced the daunting task of 
reinvigorating the border strategy on both the Mexican and Canadian borders.  Under 
mounting public pressures, the new Agency launched initiatives in Arizona to counter the 
weakest spot along the border – the area where execution of the earlier strategy had 
stalled.  These new efforts, however, have not been successful in reducing the illegal flow 
or changing its composition and character.  Part of the reason is that the Border Patrol 
and its new parent, Customs and Border Protection, have concentrated on interdiction 
rather than prevention.  New performance incentives have reinforced the value of tactics 
that increase, not decrease, the number of arrests.  The agencies’ attention has also 
returned to efforts to track, locate, and detain illegal immigrants, and to maximizing the 
physical removal of unauthorized crossers after they have been prosecuted.
Reports of Al Qaeda’s interests in smuggling terrorists or weapons across the 
Southwest border have only very recently begun to challenge the inherent limits of these 
latest border control strategies.  An enforcement posture focused on intercepting 
smuggled persons after they have reached U.S. soil, and often after they have made it to 
an interior urban area, offers little protection and reassurance.  Rather, it reinforces public 
perceptions that the border is “out of control” more generally.
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A prevention-first strategy, especially for the Southwest border, should include a 
dramatic reinvigoration of the full, comprehensive approach to the border initiated with 
the 1994 Border Patrol Strategic Plan.  Further improvement in the capacities of the 
Border Patrol is necessary, and they may come with the new American Shield Initiative 
(ASI) already embraced by Congress in the 2006 budget.  Yet ASI or other operations 
will simply not suffice if they remain rooted in an approach preoccupied with interdiction, 
detention and removal rather than deterrence and prevention in general.  A 
comprehensive plan requires renewed cooperation with Mexican officials on prevention, 
aggressive bilateral attacks on smuggling rings on both sides of the border, and a new 
spirit of engagement in promoting the economic well-being of residents all along the 
border.   
Border Screening
Border security strategies rooted in “prevention through preemption” primarily 
involve the use of information screening techniques.  The purpose of screening is to 
identify and stop those who are in the act of committing a border-related violation before 
they have a chance to start.  Federal border security agencies have long conducted 
screening of cargo and people approaching the United States through sea and air.  These 
efforts expanded dramatically during the 1990s and were extended to travel and 
transportation routes that approached the border by land.  In the early 1990s, for instance, 
the U.S. Customs Service and the INS merged separate screening initiatives into a single, 
advanced passenger information system to obtain and review information on travelers 
before they landed in the United States.  The database and the core technology created for 
this system still serves border agencies today.
Though the infrastructure may be outdated, the concept of advanced passenger or 
cargo information remains sound.  Such initiatives clearly serve to forwardly deploy the 
analytical capacities of border agencies.  The more information on cargo and people 
destined for the United States that is received and analyzed before departure from the 
country of origin, the more effective and efficient processing of the decision to admit or 
not can occur.  These advanced information systems also help to increase U.S. security 
influence abroad by framing international agreements that foster cooperation to enforce 
common standards for travel documents and cargo manifests.
During the 1990s, U.S. border agencies also began to collect biometric information on 
border crossers.  Initially, the initiative involved fingerprinting apprehended illegal 
border crossers through a system known as IDENT.  The system provided a two-
fingerprint identity check the INS used to identify criminals among apprehended illegal 
migrants.  In 1996, Congress also required the INS to begin to develop an Entry-Exit 
system that could match the identity of a person when he entered and left the United 
States.  Both systems would substantially increase the ability of border security agencies 
to track international travelers and intercept anyone of special interest.  Before 9/11, these 
systems had merged to form the backbone of the US-VISIT program, a widely 
proclaimed border inspection system that compares the fingerprints of international 
travelers upon entry to the United States with the same biometric taken upon their 
departure.  
After 9/11, Congress and the Administration embraced US-VISIT as the primary 
innovation to create a border security screen against terrorism.  Although the system was 
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not designed for that mission, Congress and DHS accelerated its deployment from 
airports to land ports-of-entry.  In 2004, the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations 
reinforced support for the program.6  The Commission noted that US-VISIT helped to 
establish a sequence of “checkpoints” through which potential terrorists and terrorist 
supporters would have to pass on their way to and from the United States.  
Without further review of the potential value of US-VISIT for this new anti-terrorism 
mission, the Administration fully embraced the Commission’s recommendations.  It 
issued another Presidential Directive, HSPD-11, that pushed DHS to demonstrate a 
resolve to fulfill the Commission’s proposals by creating a comprehensive anti-terrorist 
screen.7  Building on HSPD-6, which had already called for creation of and use of 
screening information, HSPD-11 called for development of a plan to build 
comprehensive, coordinated procedures to detect, identify, track, and interdict people, 
cargo, conveyances, and other entities and objects that posed a threat to homeland 
security.
Some of the proposals for the collection and use of screening information have 
sparked considerable public controversy, and support for screening efforts may have 
begun to dwindle significantly.  Recently, both Senate and House Appropriations 
Subcommittees have deleted funding in the 2006 Budget for DHS’ planned Office of
Screening Coordination and Operations.  The Office was designed specifically to manage 
information collection, coordination, screening, and risk assessment activities.
One reason for this decline in support is that border agencies have failed to convince 
Congressional and public stakeholders that these systems and activities are effective.  
Proponents inside the government often do not understand the limits and purposes of the 
advanced screening techniques and have oversold their promised effectiveness.  Critics of 
information-based screening systems have also generally misrepresented their expected 
value in two ways.  First, critics and proponents alike have concentrated on the value of 
these systems for border interdiction and overstated the expectation that they can target 
specific terrorists.  Screening systems, such as US-VISIT, actually have a very low 
chance of detecting a specific target, partly because the number of terrorists is so small, 
compared to the entire population of international travelers or domestic air passengers, 
and partly because they are not built to make precise determinations of individual 
behavior.  If a screening system as analytically immature as US-VISIT actually could 
identify specific terrorists with effectiveness, the nation would be in much less danger 
than most observers believe. 
Second, critics in particular have misunderstood the more valuable preemptive and 
deterrent role of screening systems such as US-VISIT. 8  The typical, overused criticism 
of border screening systems is that they merely produce a “bubble effect” along the 
perimeter of the United States.  Enforcement in one area, critics argue, simply displaces 
the problem, creating greater pressure in another location.  The “border as balloon” 
metaphor may have been useful in a security situation where the threat was a 
homogeneous, relatively constant pressure.  Today, however, the threats facing the border 
are highly differentiated, disconnected, and fragmented.  They are often well-informed by 
organized, intelligent groups that have a capacity to strike or smuggle, but only in 
particular places against specific targets.  Border security is now much more an 
intelligent environment demanding advanced risk assessment tools and strategic 
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operations than traditional encounters of mass force pressuring an outnumbered 
interdiction force. 
The value of US-VISIT and other screening systems is not so much as a targeting tool 
or a broad physical screen against a large number of intruders as it is a source of 
information for effective analytical and intelligence work.  Its primary value is to help 
assess and prepare the environment to give U.S. security agencies a much greater ability 
to preempt and deter potential aggression. 9  The biometric requirements for the system, 
for instance, aid U.S. consular officers abroad in their efforts to establish the identity and 
perform background clearance checks for visa applicants while they remain abroad.  The 
recently reported drop in visa applications in some countries of concern apparently 
reflects, at least in part, fraudulent applicants abandoning their intended course of action.
DHS’ Cargo Security Initiative (CSI) is another example of a screening system that 
can be used in limited fashion as a targeting tool or more expansively as part of a 
comprehensive prevention strategy.10  The U.S. Customs Service began in the 1980s and 
1990s to inspect cargo at the point of origin to intercept items of concern before they 
reached the United States.  The expansion of this initiative to its current form forwardly 
deploys U.S. agents and influence abroad both to inspect cargo as it is loaded on ships 
and to collect and analyze information on the cargo at each point in the global 
transportation supply chain.
The compression of time and processing requirements along the U.S. northern and 
southern borders, of course, makes it difficult for information-based screening to be much 
more than an interdiction tool.  The result is that the demand for timely inspection and 
facilitated movement across borders puts extreme pressure on efforts to stop each truck, 
car or person for inspection.  Security, in this sense, interferes with crossborder 
commercial interests even when information collection and screening is intended as a 
prevention measure.  The pressure is then to build more infrastructure, increase the 
number of inspectors, and use more intrusive technology to accelerate inspection.
Even in these situations, however, alternate, effective screening can be designed more 
as deterrence and preemption than interdiction at the physical point of border crossing.  
Pilot programs show that trucks and people can be inspected well before they reach the 
land port-of-entry.  Technology can help provide credentials for pre-clearance, and 
expanded cooperation with neighboring countries can allow much of this pre-border 
crossing preparation to occur long before the issue becomes interdiction at the border.  
Yet faced with the perception that the border is out of control and screening systems are 
ineffective in targeting, the current policy response is to push for more interdiction 
capacity, requiring ever increasing personnel to physically close the border.
Interior Enforcement as Deterrence
A third strategic focus of border security involves an effort to achieve deterrence by 
making enforcement actions inside the United States a decisive disincentive to those who 
wish to cross the border without authority.  The USA PATRIOT Act, for instance, 
provides new authorities to use immigration violations to help in its pre-emptive 
investigations of terrorism support networks and financial ties.  The objective is to 
eliminate the ways in which immigration can foster and provide safe haven to potential 
terrorists.
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In practice, however, the USA PATRIOT Act has further complicated the already 
hopelessly entangled relationships between counterterrorism actions and immigration 
enforcement.  According to public reports, most terrorist investigations in the United 
States have not resulted in terrorist-related convictions, but ended with the use of 
immigration authorities to remove a person from the country.11  Unquestionably, the 
capacity to remove a terrorist supporter from the United States is a valuable tool to say 
the least.  Yet the public appearance and understanding of these cases is that federal 
authorities are using the extraordinary powers granted under the PATRIOT Act primarily 
to achieve immigration enforcement.
This entanglement of anti-terrorism and border control strategies is counterproductive 
because it undermines the preemptive focus of PATRIOT Act investigations.  FBI 
Director Robert Mueller recognized the potential problem and went out of his way to 
reach out to immigrant communities to reassure them of the distinction between these 
security objectives.  Yet the problem persists, primarily because domestic immigration 
enforcement – as traditionally conducted – focuses more on arrest and punishment than 
on creating a prevention-oriented deterrence strategy.  Immigrant communities, rather 
than serve as sources of good information about potential activities, close up in fear of 
immigration authorities.
The contentious character of the enforcement of immigration laws in the interior of the 
United States results primarily from intrusion into local communities.  In 2004, for 
instance, the Border Patrol led a series of raids in a local California community that 
sparked national controversy.  While the operations were legal, the community reaction 
was so contentious, and the operations so ineffective, that DHS officials apologized 
publicly for the action and committed to a future policy of restraint.12
The controversy over how interior enforcement fits into border security strategy is 
long-standing.  For much of the 1990s, Congress and the Administration debated 
competing approaches to interior enforcement that, for the most part, contrasted reactive 
with prevention-oriented strategies.  A reactive approach focused primarily on three 
principles.  First, enforcement at the workplace, often in the form of raids, would deter 
employers from hiring undocumented workers who, in turn, without jobs, would leave 
the community and return home.  Second, borrowing from more general theories of law 
enforcement, significant penalties, including detention and substantial sentences, would 
convince migrants to return and stay home.  Third, large programs of removal, and a high 
expectation or certainty of deportation, would eliminate the incentive to try to find work 
in the United States.  Immigration enforcement, in this sense, should conform to tough 
law enforcement policies, such as California’s Three Strikes law.  Arrest, detention and 
removal would create a deterrent to future illegal migration.  
In each area, however, interior enforcement comes up short of its goals.  Arrests at 
worksites rarely leave migrants without other work options and many displaced workers 
return to the same employer.  The number of interior arrests continues to climb, but so 
too does the number of illegal migrants.  As both increase, the cost of detention and 
removal skyrockets.  Removal and deportation also fail.  The recidivism rate among 
deported migrants is reportedly very high.  Stories from law enforcement officials tell of 
migrants who are removed from a workplace and deported, only to be seen two days later 
back to work at the same job.
8 Homeland Security Affairs Vol.  [2005], No. 1, Article 2
http://www.hsaj.org/hsa/volI/iss1/art2
Even illegal migrants who commit a crime while in the United States, and are 
imprisoned and subsequently deported, return to the same community in a relatively short 
period.  In one study, over half of illegal migrant felons incarcerated in a California city’s 
jail returned to the same city within two years after deportation – and were rearrested for 
a newly-committed offense.13  With such rampant recidivism, traditional tactics do not 
affect the underlying problem but rather displace valuable resources from other strategies 
that may be more effective.
The alternative prevention strategy developed in the 1990s was inspired by 
community-policing innovations.  Its primary goal was to deter illegal activities 
throughout a community, starting with those areas in which local communities and INS 
could cooperate, including local crimes, social disorder, and delinquency.  As 
cooperation increased, the focus could turn to problems related to drug smuggling, human 
trafficking, labor abuse and fraud.  Operations were also designed to protect victims of 
crime regardless of their status as local residents or newcomers.
The alternative strategy also concentrated on anti-smuggling operations, especially on 
U.S. residents complicit in organizing and assisting people to cross the border illegally.  
With these initiatives, domestic immigration enforcement was on the path parallel with 
investigations of organized crime.  The objective was to hold accountable those who were 
responsible for the financial and employment connections that assisted migrants.  Early 
investigations, using the wiretap authority granted INS by the 1996 law, demonstrated 
that fairly large employers in Georgia, Texas and the Midwest were directly involved in 
conspiracies to smuggle people across the Southwest border.
The alternative domestic strategy also aimed to transform the incentives and 
conditions of local labor markets in the United States that sustain a silent, yet profound, 
corruption of the U.S. political economy.14  As deterrence, rather than a punishment-
oriented strategy, the operational focus was on changing the conditions that existed 
before employers were charged and workers were arrested and deported.  Employers 
were given tools to improve their level of compliance with existing laws, including an 
innovative information system that allowed them to check the legal status of newly-hired 
workers.
Like similar prevention measures taken in border communities, these innovations 
generated opposition from both sides of the political spectrum.  As the history of 
community policing forewarned, community activists objected to an approach that tried 
to improve the relationships between local residents and immigration officials.  Law 
enforcement critics, in contrast, objected to actions that did not obligate INS officers to 
arrest and deport individual migrants.  Prevention steps appeared “too soft.”
In the years following 9/11, DHS dropped a community-oriented approach to interior 
enforcement and tilted entirely toward an arrest-and-deport strategy.  Reportedly, Bureau 
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) leadership rejected the preventive 
approach, calling it “social work.”  In staff meetings, ICE leaders pressed agents to focus 
on high-profile prosecutions and convictions of other crimes.  Apparently, even though 
protection against terrorism was quickly embraced as the top priority, prevention of 
terrorism did not include efforts to deter illegal immigration.
DHS now has the challenge of reengaging in preventive strategies toward border 
enforcement.  Public pressure is mounting over both the perceived weaknesses of current 
operations and their high costs.  So far, DHS appears to be continuing down the path of 
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ever-expanding detention and removal priorities.  No evidence exists, however, that this 
time the path will lead to more effective outcomes.
The Administration has also proposed another familiar mitigation strategy related to 
illegal workers.  Current proposals call for a new guestworker program designed to solve 
the workplace enforcement challenge by legalizing workers employed in certain 
industries.  Very little in the proposal, however, seeks to change the circumstances that 
attracted employers to hire illegal workers in the first place, increase compliance with 
regulations, or create alternatives for employers or legally resident workers to reduce the 
demand for these workers.  In the past, contract labor markets have given way, with time, 
to renewed illegal immigration.  Without changing the underlying conditions, current 
proposals may not prevent a recurrence of existing problems.
STEPS TOWARD PREVENTION
In each area of border security strategy discussed above, program development since 9/11 
has consistently pulled interdiction back on the stage as the top priority, often by 
replacing prevention-oriented approaches.  DHS has moved back to reaction, mitigation, 
and recovery.  Undoubtedly, transformation to a new, different set of priorities would be 
difficult and organizationally wrenching at a time when there are numerous issues 
competing for leadership attention.  Still, the nation is not trying to solve border security 
problems of the past.  It is trying hard to improve border security to help prevent the next 
attacks.  
The value of prevention as the nation’s first priority is not limited, of course, to an 
interest in border security.  Rather, transformation of a border security strategy must be 
aligned with and live up to broader and more comprehensive principles of the nation’s 
foreign and domestic policies.  Prevention deserves its place as the nation’s top priority 
because it encompasses both the necessity to achieve security and an ambition to improve 
the human condition throughout the global community.  Ultimately, prevention is 
dependent on human freedom and, as Nobel Prize economist Amarty Sen reminds us, the 
existence of viable choices to achieve basic human security.
During the Cold War, containment strategy offered the world a set of these choices.  
Alliance with the free world brought participation in world trade, foreign aid, and open 
cultural expression.  Opposition induced blockades and boycotts.  Individuals throughout 
the world also understood that if they resisted Soviet-backed repression they would be 
encouraged and welcomed in the West.  U.S. strategy aimed not only to stop opponents 
from aggression, but also consistently to encourage nations, groups, and individuals to 
opt for the path of freedom.
Understandably, since September 11, 2001, strategists have focused much more on 
suppression of actions than on expansion of choices.  Yet, the success of the nation’s 
security strategy will require taking action to create viable alternatives to the current 
conditions that give rise to terrorism, illegal immigration and other illicit efforts to defeat 
U.S. border controls.  It will require a transformation of the nation’s security plans and 
will not be achieved simply by solving challenges that face border inspectors and patrol 
officers.
Positive steps toward transformation call for a bold, bipartisan approach.  The current 
Administration’s democracy initiative, for example, aims to expand choices in parts of 
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the world that for decades have enjoyed few.  Regardless of how far that initiative still 
must go, the objective to expand human freedom is sound.  Steps toward transformation 
also embody the earlier priorities of former Democratic administrations that focused on 
adherence to fundamental human rights as requirements of participation with the United 
States in global initiatives.
In that spirit, moving toward a prevention strategy of border security will require new 
policies toward our neighbors, Mexico and Canada, and toward other migrant-sending 
countries.  It will require new forms of cooperation, many of which have been resisted 
until now or not yet even imagined.  Sending countries, for instance, will need to accept 
greater responsibility for the conditions of their citizens in migrant-origin communities.
Unfortunately, current understanding of crossborder and transnational movements is 
rooted in a philosophy and perspective that denies freedom and choice as essential 
strategic goals.  Many social scientists, policymakers and advocates, for example, believe 
that the current forms of migration and border problems in general are inevitable 
conditions.  Some social scientists, for instance, mistake progressive ideas about the 
severe constraints on opportunity from unequal labor market structures with historical 
determinism and lack of human accountability.15  The Mexican Government routinely 
asserts that its current mismatch between job and population growth rates will 
“inevitably” cause emigration.  Advocates in the United States, such as the Essential 
Worker Coalition, argue that particular groups of workers are necessary for certain 
segments of the economy.  Inevitability and necessity, however, defy freedom.  
Prevention needs to be understood more fully in terms of a capacity to create options that 
outweigh the seemingly ”inevitable” patterns and limitations of current circumstances.  
Without options, border strategy shrinks to debates on management tactics, arguments 
over interdiction and ever-escalating levels of punishment.
Among a wide range of next steps, transformation toward a prevention-led border 
strategy would involve at least the following four strategic shifts.
1.  Aligning Border Security with Global Strategy:  Transformation toward prevention 
requires a much more forward-leaning foreign policy toward countries of emigration.  
For many migrant-sending countries, this will involve a radical shift of orientation.  U.S. 
immigration policy remains largely a Cold-War artifact.  As mentioned previously, in the 
days of Cold War rivalries between East and West, the benefit of an alliance involved 
easier access to the U.S. market, regardless of the means, mechanisms or conditions.  The 
Mexican Government, for example, continues to operate within this framework.  It 
currently expects that its “special relationship” with the United States should lead to an 
exceptional migration agreement as part of its overall alliance with its neighbor.
In the 21st century, however, alliances involve non-state actors at sub-national levels 
as much as if not more than homogeneous state-to-state interests.  Opposition is 
differentiated, decentralized, and asymmetric.  As with commercial trade agreements, 
policies toward migration should increasingly reflect more than volume and ease of 
movement.  They must include agreement on the standards of what crosses, who certifies 
and takes responsibility for its legality, and how to ensure compliance.  Unlike in the 
days of the Cold War rivalry, sending governments must be willing and supportive of 
efforts to create viable options to illegal entry into a friendly neighboring country.
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2.  Forging a New Foreign Policy:  Border security requires a realignment of policies 
with the nation’s neighbors, especially Mexico.  For decades, the Mexican Government 
has insisted that it has little responsibility for the enormous and sustained movement of 
its citizens across U.S. borders without U.S authorization.  It has rested that perspective 
on an interpretation of a Constitution written almost a hundred years ago during an 
authoritarian moment when security and freedom in Mexico required the ability to escape 
tyranny.  Today, Mexico is capable of creating options and taking responsibility for its 
citizens.  Yet the government refuses to take even minimally effective public safety 
action to prevent its citizens from endangering themselves and families by accepting 
smuggling arrangements.
For its part, U.S. policy no longer needs to rely on slowly nurturing democratic 
reforms in Mexico to ensure stability.  Mexico is now moving forcibly toward democracy 
and it is time to for the United States to forge a more forward-leaning partnership with 
reform elements in Mexico.  The North American Partnership of 2005 could become a 
good initial step in these reforms if its implementation is prevention-oriented, and not just 
a framework to maintain the status quo.16  At present, publicly-announced programs 
within the Partnership remain limited to familiar efforts to build a common screening 
perimeter and to coordinate emergency responses.
3.  Making Progress on Cooperation:  One of the challenges to achieving a prevention-
oriented border strategy is the persistent inability to make cooperation work.  
Transformation of border security is a large, comprehensive task not to be reduced to 
improvement in single systems, deployment of greater resources, modernization of 
technology, or even new policies designed to change the volume and characteristics of 
migrants and travelers in general.  A goal of creating “One face at the border,” for 
example, is a solution to the management problems of the last fifty years.  What is needed 
is a strategy for conducting border security in the 21st century.
A prevention strategy would include a network of allied, multinational customs and 
migration officers working together to enforce minimum standards at critical points of 
international travel.  The Cargo Security Initiative described previously is a constructive 
step in that direction.  It will benefit both the United States and the entire world trading 
system.  Immigration officials could also deploy overseas, although there has been much 
more opposition to that move.  In the late 1990s, however, five countries joined in a pilot 
program to test the value of such forwardly-deployed coordination.  Officials from each 
of five countries were placed overseas working alongside officers in the sending and 
transit countries.  The results showed that in just a few weeks of coordinated action, 
officers were able to prevent more people with false documents and identities from 
boarding planes for the United States than inspectors working only from their traditional 
position in U.S. ports of entry were able to detect in a three-month period.
Despite declarations of the need for shared responsibility for migration and border 
matters, the realities are that implementation of prevention measures strains 
governments’ commitments.  Even after the urgency of 9/11, coordination and joint 
decision-making on border security measures remain difficult.  The United States and 
Canada, for example, are struggling to achieve even a limited agreement on coordinating 
with each other on decisions related to visa waivers for the new member countries of 
NATO.
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4.  Changing U.S. Reactive Approaches:  The myth of workplace enforcement as a 
deterrent to illegal immigration highlights the way in which current strategies have a 
corrupting influence on U.S. domestic policy in general and labor policy in particular.  
An effective strategic choice should not be between “essential” and “non-essential” 
workers, as the reform debate in the United States currently poses the issue.  A 
prevention priority must involve active pursuit of a range of alternatives for employers 
and workers alike, creating more opportunities and more options.  
The difficulties in making these four initial strategic shifts underscore a deep-seated 
barrier to effective, prevention-oriented border strategies.  Prevention requires trust, both 
between agencies that must share information, leads, and enforcement action, and more 
fundamentally among the public in each country that must perceive and accept legitimate 
and effective actions on both sides of the border.  Even the three members of The North 
American Partnership lack the degree of social trust required to forge new, prevention-
oriented cooperative strategies.   
CONCLUSION
The 9/11 Commission faulted U.S. leaders for a failure of imagination in preventing the 
terrorist attacks.  Unfortunately, in the realm of border security strategy, little evidence 
exists that federal leaders have reached beyond their commitment to hard work and 
accelerated implementation of long-standing initiatives and policies.  Perhaps the 
Commission was wrong, and what is needed is only enhanced performance and more 
resources.  Yet, the persistent call for a new prevention priority should challenge leaders 
to go beyond implementing border security programs correctly.  The question is whether 
they are pursuing the correct programs. 
Prevention, in the sense used throughout this article, is a concept that gives priority to 
imagination.  It requires creation of alternatives to both existing conditions and widely-
accepted perspectives.  It also demands answers to the hardest questions.  What would it 
take for a certain behavior not to occur?  What would it take to give potential terrorists, 
and fraudulent travelers, viable alternatives?  In this age of terror, the answers are 
consequential.
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1“I don’t think you can win [the war on terror].”
– George W. Bush
“He was talking about winning it in the conventional sense ... about how this is a 
different kind of war and we face an unconventional enemy.”
– White House spokesman Scott McClellan1
May 20, 2005 passed with little notice in America.  It marked 1,347 days since the 
September 11th attack.  The same number of days separated December 7, 1941 from the 
end of the Second World War. This “different kind of war” will not end.  There is no 
politically palatable way for a leader to say, “OK, we won.  The Global War on Terror is 
over.  Everyone go back to Green.”
Like its semantic relatives the War on Drugs and the War on Poverty, the Terrorism 
War will last as long as there are homeland security industries, bureaucracies, and 
congressional committees.  And an enemy.  There is no war on terrorism without 
terrorists – considered now, under U.S. law and sentencing guidelines, as anyone whose 
action “appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population."2  Since a 
terrorist can include criminals who fly planes into buildings, detonate bombs at sporting 
events, set SUVs on fire, release laboratory animals, and make methamphetamines, we 
will never run out of terrorists.  
PREVENTION REMAINS OUR FIRST NATIONAL PRIORITY
Because we are in this for the long run, it is important to remember what we are trying to 
accomplish.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security published in 2002 identifies 
prevention as the first of four goals.  In April, 2005, Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff reaffirmed the importance and priority of prevention 
when he told Congress our homeland security strategy was to keep terrorists “off the 
boards, prevent them from coming in, prevent them from shipping their stuff in, 
protecting our infrastructure and transportation if they do get in, and then if worse comes 
to worst, … being able to respond the [sic] mitigate the harm.”3  In word, if not in deed, 
prevention remains our first priority.
After more time than we devoted to Word War II, how are we doing?  We  have not 
been attacked in almost four years.  By the end of 2005, we will have spent about 175 
billion dollars on homeland security.  Information sharing, while not perfect, has 
dramatically improved – at least among law enforcement agencies.  We have a dozen 
homeland security-related national strategies; fifty-plus state and territory strategies; 
thirteen homeland security presidential directives; and a growing mound of 
implementation guides, cloaked by such New Deal-sounding acronyms as NRP, NIMS, 
NPG, NIPP, UTL, and TCL. 
On the surface, our prevention strategy is working.  Look under the surface however, 
and one is hard pressed to identify what that prevention strategy is. 
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HAS ANYONE SEEN THE TERRORISM PREVENTION PLAN?
The Committee is concerned that while terrorism prevention is a national 
priority, little is being done to create prevention expertise in our nation's first 
responders.  This is in stark contrast to response and recovery training 
programs.  Without a well-developed terrorism prevention plan, State and local 
agencies lack a key piece in the fight against terrorism.
– House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, June 2004 4
Imagine a parallel universe where World War II is still going on.  There is a strategy 
meeting in President Roosevelt’s office.  The Director of the Office of Civilian Defense 
is speaking:
“When the German’s attack, Mr. President, here’s how we’ll be organized.  We will use 
the National System for Managing Any Incident….”
“Wait,” says the President, “First tell me how we will prevent the Germans from 
attacking.”
“Well,” says the Director, “our National System for Managing Any Incident has a strong 
prevention component.  Everyone will work together and share information.  But once 
we’re attacked….”
“Stop.  How do we prevent the attack in the first place?”
“Mr. President,” says the Director, “You’ll recall we have a National Response Plan, 
and….”
“I don’t want to respond,” says the President.  “I want to prevent.”
“The country has not been attacked since December 7th, Mr. President.  And the 
Germans have never attacked our homeland.  Our plans are working.”
Almost four years have gone by since the nation formally joined the global war on 
terrorism.  Yet something still is preventing us from giving as much – if not more –
attention to prevention as we give to preparing to respond to the next attack.  
One reason is money.  The political economy of homeland security is biased toward 
response.  A lot of money has been made selling equipment and services to first 
responders.  There is a much more limited economic market for prevention.  We do not 
know how much we are spending on prevention because we do not yet have a common 
understanding of what we do when we are preventing terrorism.  
The Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee quotation, above, alluded to a 
“terrorism prevention plan.”  What is that?  Where is it?  Why is it taking so long to put 
together?  What is preventing homeland security from preventing terrorism?
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IT IS THE SYSTEM, NOT THE PEOPLE
"We've got to have a prevention strategy that is focused on finding those 
terrorists before they act.  Very little, I will hasten to add, of what the 
Department of Homeland Security spends its money on these days is devoted to 
what ought to be a high priority.  We've got to reconfigure in order to do that."5
– Christopher Cox, [Former] Chairman of House Committee on Homeland Security 
It would be completely erroneous to say we do not have comprehensive national or 
local prevention plans because no one wants them.  It would be foolish to blame any 
person or institution for the failure to make prevention the first priority in more than 
name only.  There are many people at all levels of government who take with heart attack 
seriousness the prevention mission.  But we have been at this longer than WWII, and we 
still do not have a cohesive – or articulated – national prevention strategy.  Something is 
wrong.  
Edwards Deming, the continuous improvement authority, used to say, “We are being 
ruined by the best efforts of people who are doing the wrong thing.”  To Deming, systems 
rather than people were the problem.  “All that happens comes from the system, not the 
workers…,” he said.  “It’s absolutely frightening, … just frightening."6
The same dynamic is festering in homeland security: the best efforts of the best people 
are being applied to the wrong things.  As Christopher Cox, former Chairman of the 
House Committee on Homeland Security suggests, the homeland security system is not 
designed to support prevention as its first priority.  It is designed to respond.  It is 
leadership’s job to reconfigure the homeland security system, to make the system’s 
outputs conform to the priorities of our national strategy.  
“Reconfiguring the system” does not mean simply reorganizing the Department of 
Homeland Security.  A secure homeland is the outcome of national, state, local, private 
sector and citizen activities.  It is not the sole responsibility of any national, state or local 
agency.
Deming argued for the preeminence of process.  If you understand system processes, 
he said, you can figure out what needs to be done to continuously improve that system.  
Before trying to redesign the entire homeland security apparatus, however, it may be 
helpful to examine three systemic fears that get in the way of discovering how the
activities of that system – the process – can match the espoused priority of prevention.  
They are the fear of new behavior, the fear of imagination, and the fear of emergence.
THE FEAR OF NEW BEHAVIOR
In late 2004, public safety executives from a mid western state participated in a homeland 
security tabletop exercise.  The first scenario was designed to stimulate conversation 
about how to prevent a potential attack from happening.  The discussion was low energy 
and uninspired.  Participants were unsure how to talk about prevention.
But then an attack scenario was presented.  The exercise moved into response and 
recovery.  Participants became animated.  They talked faster, had more detailed 
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knowledge, and were professionally confident.  They demonstrated they knew what to do 
once an incident has happened.  
The same pattern was repeated in more than a dozen similar state homeland security 
exercises: people participating in the exercises could not grab hold of “prevention” with 
the same emotion they poured into “response.”  The reason?  The public safety leaders 
had a lot of experience responding to critical incidents.  They had practically no 
experience sharing at least awareness that they were doing prevention. 
New Roles, New Behaviors
Preventing terrorism is a new role for public safety agencies.  They are used to 
responding to daily emergencies, not stopping acts of war.  As a generalization, one can 
say they tend to avoid prevention because they already know how to do response.  It is 
partially a learning problem.  Adults and organizations prefer doing things they already 
know how to do – even if that means redefining the “new” so it looks like the old; hence 
the demand for new and better response equipment – whether or not it can be used or 
maintained. 
The United States has the world’s best disaster response system.  With the possible 
exception of a wide scale biological or cyber attack, we can meet the challenge of any 
incident – no matter how horrendous.  That does not mean we have finished improving 
our response system.  But continuing to make response our de facto priority is like  
searching for lost car keys under a street light because the light is better there.  We know 
much less about how to prevent.  It is in this Terra Incognito we can make the most 
progress expanding our capability to secure the homeland.
We have a Roadmap for Prevention
While prevention may be a new public safety idea, we know more than most people in 
homeland security are aware of.  In 2003, the DHS issued Preparedness Guidelines for 
Homeland Security.  The Guidelines have three features that make it unique among the 
paniculated documents produced since September 11th.  It was built from the ground up 
by first preventers.  It was vetted by first preventers.  It gave other public safety 
professionals practical advice about how to prevent terrorism.  For some reason, the 
Guidelines are also largely unknown in the homeland security community. 
The Guidelines identifies five elements of a prevention strategy: collaboration, 
information sharing, threat recognition, risk management, and intervention.  Each of 
these elements is further divided into specific activities that support the prevention 
strategy.  The two core elements of those Guidelines – collaboration and information 
sharing – cost comparatively little in monetary terms.  They mostly require people, 
organizations and professions to change their attitudes and behaviors.  The core elements 
work only when there is a committed effort to change.  Their success is more a function 
of sociology than technology.
The Guidelines can be a foundation for developing local prevention plans.  Some 
jurisdictions – in Kansas City, KA and Frederick County, MD, for example – have 
already used the Guidelines this way.  
The Guidelines also can help with the thorny problem of how to measure prevention.  
The prevention activities included within each of the five elements are empirically 
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derived proxies for prevention.  If the elements are present and working effectively in a 
jurisdiction, there is a greater likelihood a process is in place to prevent terrorism.
The Prevention Guidelines – or something similar – are as important to homeland 
security as the National Incident Management System (NIMS).  The national government 
threatens to withhold funds to jurisdictions that are not “NIMS compliant.”  If prevention 
is so important, the Grant Threat strategy could be extended to agencies – and the private 
sector (perhaps with what amounts to a tax penalty) – that are not “prevention 
compliant.”  The Prevention Guidelines make concrete what it means to prevent 
terrorism.
THE FEAR OF IMAGINATION
The 9/11 Commission Report cited the failure of imagination as one of four failures 
revealed by the attack.  The post 9/11 spending hemorrhage has fertilized imaginative 
technology – although there is no evidence the absence of technology contributed 
significantly to the September attacks.  At the national level, there have been no 
especially imaginative innovations in policy, strategy or how we are organized to prevent 
terrorism.  The NIMS is a modification of a thirty-year-old template for responding to 
emergencies.  The lackluster “Vision for the National Preparedness Goal” reads like a 
“what-not-to-do” example in a government writing class.  Merging 22 agencies into one 
is – although on a major league scale – a traditional organizational response to not 
knowing for sure what to do.
If this truly is, as presidential spokesman Scott McClellan asserts, “a different kind of 
war,” we are still fighting it with old ideas, old structures, and old methods.  Four years 
and counting.  Where is the imagination that the 9/11 Commission called for?
Here are two ideas: confront the American people with the reality of what terrorism can 
do to our society, and use free market ideas to predict the risk of specific attacks.
“… nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror”
Prevention has to mean more than just stopping attacks.  It also ought to mean 
preventing terrorists from achieving the goals their attacks are meant to accomplish. 
How would Americans react economically, politically, and socially if twenty suicide 
bombs went off within the same hour in shopping malls all over the country?  What if 
smallpox starts to show up?  Or if transit systems in our cities are attacked like London’s 
or Madrid’s?  What if car bombs start detonating in American cities with the frequency 
they explode in Iraq?  What happens if an airplane is shot down as it takes off from an 
American airport?
It would cost about 40 billion dollars to install missile defense systems on the nation’s 
commercial air fleet over the next two decades to protect against shoulder fired missile 
attacks.  Experts are split over the likelihood of such an attack.  But there is general 
agreement that the central justification for even considering such an expenditure is 
because “of the enormous economic consequences that would result if the public were to 
lose confidence in flying.7”  The terrorist target is not the airplane, or the mall, or the 
subway.  Bin Laden has made his goal clear.  The target is our economy: “We bled 
Russia for ten years until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat….  We 
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are continuing in the same policy to make America bleed profusely to the point of 
bankruptcy."8
Thomas J. Housel and Arthur H. Bell argue, in “Limiting the Impact of Terrorist Acts: 
Accessing the Wisdom Base of a Hardened U.S. Populace,” that the American people are 
insufficiently prepared to prevent the economic and social disruption such an attack 
would create.9  History teaches that people as well as critical infrastructure can be 
hardened against terror.  If the enemy wants to wreck our economy by making people 
afraid to take the subway or go to malls, part of our approach to prevention should be to 
undercut the power of the terrorist strategy by toughening people against what is likely to 
happen again in our lifetime.  If we are in a real, not a symbolic, war, men and women 
and children will die.  Trying to protect Americans from that truth – as we do with the 
casualties of the Iraq war – eviscerates one of the fundamental weapons in our prevention 
arsenal.  
Stephen Flynn suggests we are in a “phony war” period similar to the eight months 
after the Germans invaded Poland in September 1939.  Read or listen to what Winston 
Churchill told the British people: “I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and 
sweat.”  His prediction was correct, but the residents of London went on with their lives 
in spite of daily Luftwaffe air raids.  Compare that to the fuzzy way we have prepared 
American citizens for the next attack – and for what they can do about helping to prevent 
the attack and – more importantly – the consequences of an attack.
Placing Bets on the Second Attack
The most imaginative strategic idea for fighting terrorism we have so far seen was the 
Policy Analysis Market (PAM), incorrectly known as “terrorism futures.”  It was 
designed to use speculative markets to forecast geopolitical trends.  People who did not 
know what they were talking about perceived it as a way to bet on terrorist attacks.10  The 
PAM was an effort to create decision markets about the potential consequences of policy 
actions.  It was premised on the assumption that markets are efficient and effective 
aggregators of information.  Empirically, markets do a better job of assessing risks than 
reports or experts.  It does not get much more American than calling on free market 
concepts to help prevent terrorism.
But what a ruckus this new idea caused.  It was cancelled one day after the project 
came to the attention of the mainstream press.  One might debate the pros and cons of 
decision markets as a way to look at prevention policies.  But that debate never happened.  
Do we have such a surplus of ideas that we are incapable of withholding judgment long 
enough to listen to what the idea is before it is killed?  What other innovative ideas about 
policy, strategy, and organization have been blocked by homeland security mind guards?
If public sector decision markets prove to be an advance on our current policymaking 
capabilities, homeland security will eventually adopt them.  But who knows how much 
time will go by – how many questionable decisions made – before then.  In theory, some 
of the initial stakeholder confusions and disagreements over NIMS, the Target 
Capabilities List, and other DHS efforts could have been minimized if decision futures 
markets would have been encouraged to weigh in.  But we will never know.
The larger problem is not how the DHS writes rules.  It is a system-wide bias against 
imagination.  This can be addressed, in theory, by a commitment to “seek first to 
understand” ideas before killing them.  Perhaps a small reserve of seed funds could be 
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used for “imagination grants.”  These would be provided to communities, states, the 
private sector, and national government agencies – anyone who has an inventive and 
intellectually plausible idea about how to expand our capacity to prevent terrorism.11
The 9/11 Commission called for institutionalizing imagination.  That has not yet been 
done.  It needs to be.
THE FEAR OF EMERGENCE
During the past three years, many federal agencies … have made efforts 
to secure input and comments from the state, tribal, and local public safety 
community.  Unfortunately, these efforts are too often limited to 
participation in advisory panels and working groups that have little 
impact on policy development and instead are relegated to the role of 
providing post-development comments on completed, or nearly completed, 
policy proposals.  Consequently, the ability of state, tribal, and local law 
enforcement to truly influence policy has been minimized.12
The third fear is the dread of what happens if you stop trying to control everything.  It is 
based on a proposition demonstrated by experience time and again: control is not a 
property of complex human systems.  The social, political, and economic world is not a 
product of control.  It is the resultant of an emergent, self-organizing process.13  That does 
not mean homeland security professionals play no role in shaping the system.  But they 
are partners, not controllers.  Homeland security leaders can benefit from transforming 
their thinking from a hierarchical to a network mindset.
Envision the textbook pyramid of “How Our Government Works:” the national 
government is on top, telling the states what to do to the cities and counties.  Using the 
relatively new policy mechanism of the “presidential law,” otherwise known as 
Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD), the national government now tells 
states and cities what they need to do to secure the homeland.  States and cities have 
allowed this to happen for a variety of reasons – ranging from the perception that 
homeland security is little more than a way to get grant funds, to the authentic belief that 
it is the national government’s job to set the homeland security agenda.  
The national government, partly through default, partly through arrogance, and partly 
because of the career history of institutional leaders, has welcomed the opportunity to 
decide what is best for homeland security.  Most homeland security guidance documents 
are the product of this hierarchical mentality.  From the National Strategy through the 
HSPDs and the follow-on suite of implementation documents, the national government 
has been telling its subordinate units what to do.  
Because this is the 21st century, however, it is symbolically necessary to get “input 
from the locals.”  But as recent reports from the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Government Accountability Office, and the Congressional Research Service 
indicate, the well-meaning efforts at inclusion are largely unconvincing to those on the 
frontlines of homeland security.14
The dominant metaphor driving homeland security aspirations is “the well-oiled 
machine,” steered by an informed central authority.  It is based on the theory that if all 
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the parts – states, cities, private sector, citizens, and the national government agencies –
are operating from the same design (e.g., the NPG, NRP, NIMS, TCL, and so on) we will 
have one integrated system that will achieve the national homeland security strategy.
There are two problems with the metaphor and with the behavior it encapsulates.  
First, the machine is not designed to do what it should do: prevent terrorism.  It is 
designed predominantly to create and follow rules, and to spend money for response.  
Second, the exclusionary faith in hierarchy and control sustains a societal vulnerability 
our enemy has already exploited.  
The enemy is networked.  We are too, although we could get much better at it.15  Most 
people in homeland security know that the way things really get done is through personal 
networks.  But we still talk and act as if a smoothly functioning hierarchy ought to be our 
goal; blindly maintaining this almost-vestigial twentieth century idea gets in the way of 
preventing terrorism.
DHS policy says that money should go directly to states, to then be distributed to 
cities.  Politically powerful communities have found ways of effectively bypassing states 
and going directly to DHS, at times via Congress, at other times by creating the right 
relationships with DHS and other agency leaders.  Funding is as much the product of 
networks, as of hierarchies.  
Review the collection of recent state homeland security plans.16  Many of these plans 
were spurred by rather explicit DHS grant guidance.  Yet there is extraordinarily wide 
variation in the plans.  The best explanation for why plans were written as they were rests 
in understanding the network of people and agencies responsible for the plan, not the 
guidance from the national government.  
Monitor how states and cities and counties will implement NIMS.  For some 
communities, NIMS represents a modest extension of what they already are doing.  For 
others it represents a welcome lever to get all agencies to use the incident management 
system.  For still others, it represents yet another intrusive mandate to be worked around.  
One can predict that the future of NIMS will be the resultant of the same network 
processes that helped to shape the funding and the planning profiles.  It will not be 
controlled by the national government – not because control is or is not a good idea, but 
because control is not a property of a complex human system like homeland security. 
This is not an argument to eliminate hierarchy.  It is a suggestion that since the present 
system is having such a difficult time pursuing prevention, try something different.  
Instead of struggling to control what happens in homeland security, use the power of self-
organization to see what it can contribute to expanding our prevention capabilities.  Use 
the creativity of communities, states, the private sector, and homeland security 
professional associations to evolve the next iteration of the Prevention Guidelines.  Here 
is how that might work.
First the theory: Many DHS documents talk about the need for policies and strategies 
to “evolve” as time goes by.17  “Evolve” is in quotes to emphasize that it has a meaning 
beyond the general one of “change.”  From a theoretical perspective, the evolutionary 
process is quite specific: it includes variation, selection, and reproduction.18  The first 
requirement is for variation.  The homeland security system already has lots of that – in 
spite of efforts to minimize unplanned variation.  Another word for “selection” is “best 
practices” (or, more accurately, “smart practices”19).  If there is an effective process for 
sharing smart prevention practices, it is informal and underground.  It is possible to 
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develop a mechanism – beyond the DHS Lessons Learned website (www.llis.gov) – that 
targets a specific set of prevention ideas for possible selection by agencies willing to 
experiment.  The next step is for jurisdictions to adopt – or reproduce – particular smart 
practices that do work in their environment.  This is a naturalist rather than a mechanical 
model.  It is relying on intelligent, co-evolution rather than on intelligent design by 
committee.
Now the practice: The co-evolutionary approach does not require developing any new 
implementation strategy.  Instead, it represents taking the blinders away to see what is 
actually happening – networks are organizing homeland security, not hierarchies – and 
then cooperating with the reality of how things happen, rather than remaining faithful to 
an ideal about controlling complexity. 
Possibly the best example of co-evolution in homeland security is fusion centers.  
They were not mandated.  It just seemed like a good idea that agencies with something to 
contribute to situation awareness ought to talk with each other.  That “variation” of the 
pre 9/11 compartmentalized intelligence structure was voluntarily selected and 
voluntarily reproduced by other states and communities.20
The target for the self-organizing experiment would be the DHS Prevention 
Guidelines.  The 2003 Guidelines are not the last word in prevention.  They need to be 
continuously improved as we learn more about what works.  In early 2005, a draft 
Version 2 of the Guidelines was released by DHS – but then subsequently withdrawn.  
The DHS Lessons Learned web site could post the Guidelines as a “wiki” to allow broad 
input into the continuous improvement of what works in prevention.21
The idea is to make the Prevention Guidelines an “open source” rather than a 
proprietary project within the public safety community.  It is analogous to the 
development of the Linux computer operating system, where “Given enough eyeballs, all 
bugs are shallow”.22  We should foster as much variation of the Prevention Guidelines as 
possible.  Individual agencies would be encouraged to take the guidelines, adapt them to 
their jurisdiction, and add what they learn to the Guidelines.23  Let the public safety 
market of ideas determine what can be done at state and local levels to prevent terrorism.  
There have been endless documents produced by committees working inside 
cathedrals of homeland security orthodoxy.  Let us discover if the revised guidelines for 
preventing terrorism can organize itself, using the wisdom of the “great babbling bazaar 
of differing agendas and approaches” that makes up homeland security.24
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Traditionally, local law enforcement has concerned itself primarily with preventing and 
solving crimes such as burglary, theft, and robbery — crimes that have an immediate and 
visible impact on the local community and affect citizen quality of life.  In the face of 
unknown future terrorist threats, however, local law enforcement organizations will have to 
adapt existing policing strategies to fulfill the requirement of homeland security. 
Over the years, law enforcement organizations have sought to address the causes and 
reduce the fear of crime in communities through the creation of effective partnerships with 
the community and other public and private-sector resources, the application of problem-
solving strategies or tactics, and the transformation of agency organization and culture.  In 
the wake of September 11, 2001, local law enforcement agencies throughout the country find 
themselves struggling to identify their responsibilities and define their future role in the effort 
to combat terrorism.  The new policing model for terrorism and homeland security must 
address the areas of crime prevention, intelligence gathering, and information sharing. While 
these roles are not new to local policing, homeland security at the local level will require a 
shift in law enforcement’s role if police are to ensure the safety and welfare of citizens.   
While some have suggested that community policing can fit into the overall national 
strategy for homeland security, little research specifically identifies community policing 
strategies and their direct application to the national strategy for homeland security. Many of 
the objectives of terrorism prevention parallel current law enforcement policies with respect 
to local crime issues.  Because of these similarities, individual, neighborhood, and 
community crime-prevention strategies should support law enforcement in the fight against 
terrorism.    
 
COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING 
The United States Department of Justice has defined community policing as a philosophy 
that “focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of police services that 
includes aspects of traditional law enforcement, as well as prevention, problem-solving, 
community engagement, and partnerships.”1 Despite varying definitions of community- 
oriented policing, it is generally agreed that there are three key components to the community 
policing philosophy.  These include the creation of and reliance on effective partnerships 
with the community and other public/private-sector resources, the application of problem- 
solving strategies or tactics, and the transformation of police organization and culture to 
support this philosophical shift.  In other words, community policing is not in itself a tactic or 
strategy, but instead a philosophical approach to how policing is conducted.  At its core, 
community-oriented policing is based on law enforcement and the community joining 
together to identify and address issues of crime and social disorder. 
In a 2002 publication, the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing discussed a series of community-oriented policing resources and practices that have 
a direct application to terrorism deterrence and prevention.  These include the use of crime 
mapping with GIS systems, data collection and analysis protocols, and technologies that may 
be used as platforms for gathering intelligence to assess terrorism vulnerability.   In addition, 
the community partnerships formed by police in the course of community-oriented problem 
solving provide a ready framework for engaging citizens in helping police to identify 
possible threats and implement preparedness plans.
2
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Rob Chapman and Matthew C. Scheider, Senior Analysts at the Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services (COPS), suggest that community policing could play an integral 
role in homeland security.  They contend that by applying the principles of organizational 
change, problem solving, and external partnerships, community policing can help police to 
prepare for and prevent terrorist acts, and respond to the fear such threats engender.
3
Community policing helps to build trust between the community and law enforcement, which 
allows officers to develop knowledge of the community and resident activity and can provide 
vital intelligence relating to potential terrorist actions.  Local law enforcement can facilitate 
information gathering among ethnic or religious community groups with whom police have 
established a relationship.  It will generally be citizens who observe the unusual – groups of 
men living in apartments or motels, or unusual behavior at flight schools – in their own 
community, and could be expected to report such observations to the local police.  According 
to Chapman and Scheider, problem-solving models typically used in community policing are 
well-suited for preventing and responding to possible terrorist activity.  Using existing data 




 Community policing is based on the notion that citizens should be empowered to prevent 
crime or the problems that lead to crime.
5
Establishing and maintaining mutual trust is 
therefore the central goal of community policing, as it allows wide law enforcement access to 
valuable community information leading potentially to the prevention and resolution of 
crimes. 
The partnerships formed in support of community crime prevention efforts can also 
provide a framework for engaging citizens to help police identify possible terrorist threats 
and infrastructure vulnerabilities.  Effective community policing involves not only 
developing partnerships between law enforcement and citizens, however, but also 
intergovernmental and interagency collaborations with state and federal agencies.  These 
partnerships are essential for the collection and exchange of intelligence, the identification of 
threats and vulnerabilities, and the sharing of resources in the event of an attack.   
Problem Solving 
 Problem solving is a broad term that describes the process by which specific issues or 
concerns are identified and the most appropriate remedies to abate the problem(s) are 
identified.  Problem solving is based on the assumption that “individuals make choices based 
on opportunities presented by the immediate physical and social characteristics of an area.  
By manipulating these factors, people will be less inclined to act in an offensive manner.”
6
The idea is that if the underlying conditions that create problems can be eliminated then so 
will the problem.  Such conditions range from the type of individuals involved to the physical 
environment in which these problems are created. 
Prior to the advent of community-oriented policing, problem-oriented policing was 
associated with the decentralization of responsibility and with lateral communication both 
within and outside the police department.  Problem-oriented policing dealt with the 
conditions that cause a problem; this concept of policing required officers to recognize 
relationships that lead to crime and disorder and direct their attention to issues of causation.
7
Mark Moore asserts that thought and analysis is fundamental to problem-oriented policing in 
order to effectively respond to the cause of the problem.
8
2 Homeland Security Affairs Vol.  [2005], No. 1, Article 4
http://www.hsaj.org/hsa/volI/iss1/art4
According to Spelman and Eck, problem-oriented policing converged on three main 
themes: increased effectiveness, reliance on the expertise and creativity of officers, and 
closer involvement with the community. These themes are implemented by attacking 
underlying phenomena that deplete patrol officers’ and detectives’ time, and educating 




Community policing requires an organizational transformation inside the law enforcement 
agency so that a set of basic values rather than mere procedures guide the overall delivery of 
services to the community.  Organizational transformation involves the integration of the 
community policing philosophy into the mission statement, policies and procedures, 
performance evaluations and hiring and promotional practices, training programs, and other 
systems and activities that define organizational culture and activities.
10
 
In the community policing model, individual officers are given broader freedom to resolve 
concerns within their community.  Individual officers are presumably the most familiar with 
their communities and are therefore in the best position to forge close ties with the 
community and create effective solutions.  Community policing emphasizes employee 
participation; individual officers are given the authority to solve problems and make 
operational decisions suitable to their assignments.  Officers are seen as generalists, not 
specialists.  
 
ADAPTING COMMUNITY POLICING TO HOMELAND SECURITY  
Like traditional crime, terrorism is a local crime issue and is a responsibility shared among 
federal, state, and local governments. Indeed, traditional crime and terrorism are inextricably 
linked.  International and domestic terrorist groups are well-organized and trained, and 
demonstrate the sophistication of other, traditional organized crime groups. These groups 
commit ancillary crimes like fraud, money laundering, drug trafficking, and identity theft to 
provide the resources for their terrorism.  The investigative approach to a terrorist event is 
similar to that of a traditional crime incident.  Because of the similarities between traditional 
crime and terrorism, departments that have already adopted a community policing philosophy 
should find it a seamless transition to addressing terrorism and terrorism-related crime. 
Officers should already have the skills to analyze the terrorism problem, perform threat 
analysis, develop appropriate responses and reflect these efforts in the mission, goals and 
objectives of the department.
11
 
In 2002, the Markle Foundation Task Force report stated: 
Most of the real frontlines of homeland security are outside of Washington 
D.C. Likely terrorists are often encountered, and the targets they might attack 
are protected, by local officials – a cop hearing a complaint from a landlord, 
an airport official who hears about a plane some pilot trainee left on the 
runway, an FBI agent puzzled by an odd flight school student in Arizona, or 




In a more recent report, the Rockefeller Institute observed that “while much attention has 
been focused on the national government’s efforts to address these [Homeland Security] 
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problems, there has been less consideration of the role of state and local governments, which 
play a critical role in preventing and responding to terrorist attack.”
13
 In the wake of 
September 11, 2001, however, local law enforcement has taken on a pivotal role in 
preventing and responding to future incidents of terrorism within the United States.  This 
new role, like the adoption of community policing, will require yet another shift in the 
culture of law enforcement agencies. 
Facilitating this shift, however, is the fact that community policing and homeland security 
have a great deal in common. Both neighborhood crime and terrorism threaten the quality of 
life in a community and exploit the fear they create.  Despite creative ways to stretch public 
safety budgets, local law enforcement cannot sustain two separate missions of traditional 
policing and terrorism prevention. Community policing and homeland security can share the 
same goals and strategies. Creating external partnerships, citizen involvement, problem 
solving, and transforming the organization to take on a new mission are all key elements of 
community policing and should be part of a comprehensive homeland security strategy.  The 
lesson learned from fighting traditional crime is that prevention is the most effective 
approach in dealing with crime, fear, and social disorder.  Fighting terrorism is no different. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION 
The task of a wholesale re-engineering of American local law enforcement toward a counter-
terrorism role is complex and unprecedented.  If U.S. law enforcement is to move forward to 
a national role in homeland security, then practical, focused, and effective training must be a 
cornerstone of this transformation.  Without appropriate and ongoing training of both current 
and new law enforcement personnel, homeland security will be dismissed as a passing 
concept instead of a cultural change in law enforcement strategy.   
There are a number of community policing practices that can support efforts in homeland 
security.  These practices include adopting the philosophy organization-wide, decentralizing 
decision-making and accountability, fixing geographic and general responsibilities and 
utilizing volunteer resources.  Local law enforcement officers are most likely to come into 
contact with individuals who are either directly or indirectly involved in terrorist activities 
and are certain to be the first responders to any attack.   
Empowering officers at lower levels with greater decision-making authority and 
responsibility for important decisions could be valuable in a crisis.  During a terrorist event, 
there may be little time for decisions to move up the chain of command.  Officers who are 
accustomed to making decisions and retaining authority may be better prepared to respond 
quickly and decisively to any event.   
In terms of prevention, developing a flat organizational structure can help lower-level 
officers feel free to pursue leads regarding possible terrorist activity.  In addition, officers 
who work in a fixed geographic area for an extended period are more likely to develop 




 Homeland Security, like community policing, must be adopted agency-wide to realize its 
full potential and effectiveness.  Integrating the homeland security responsibility into the 
agency’s mission statement, goals, policies and procedures, training programs, and other 
systems and activities that define organizational culture, should reflect this adoption. 
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Training 
 Local agencies will need to expand beyond the rudimentary aspects of law enforcement 
training such as firearms, driving, unarmed defense and criminal law into one that 
emphasizes an analytical preventative approach. While law enforcement must continue to 
train for their roles as first responders in post-incident management and investigation, police 
must receive training and education in: 
• Understanding the nature, dynamics, and operations of international terrorist groups that 
may operate in or against the United States, and how that translates into more effective 
patrol and investigative functions; 
• Understanding the locations, movements, and plans of international terrorist cells that live 
and work in local communities; 
• Gathering and analyzing intelligence on potential terrorist activities; 
• Conducting threat assessments; 
• Conducting inquiries and investigations into potential terrorists while safeguarding the 
constitutional rights of all people in the United States. 
Most local law enforcement officers have never been in the intelligence business and 
therefore may not know precisely what information they should look at as indicative of 
terrorist activity or that may have value within a larger intelligence context.  These signs are 
not necessarily obvious, but rather subtle, and would be discernible to a regular patrol officer 
or detective with proper training.  Officers or detectives may have valuable information 
without even knowing it and may not know to share the information because they have never 
had adequate terrorism intelligence training. 
Another area of training that law enforcement must commit to is public education.  
Although the majority of communities will never be impacted by a terrorist event, the threat 
of potential terrorist attacks can create fear and undermine the sense of community safety.  It 
will therefore be critical that police take a leadership role in maintaining community 
confidence.  This can be done by educating the public as to the nature of threats and actively 
responding to specific community concerns.  For the public to respond to an alert, it needs to 
know what to watch for.  Educating the public also garners support for government action in 
a crisis.  Moreover, citizens educated about potential threats can assist law enforcement 
during alerts.  The public would know what to look for, what to do, and how to respond.
15
 
Decentralized Decision-making and Accountability 
 In community policing, individual line officers are given authority to solve problems and 
make operational decisions.  Leadership is required and rewarded at every level; supervisors 
and officers are held accountable for decisions and the effects of their efforts at solving 
problems.  Empowering officers at the lower levels will allow them the freedom to pursue 
leads or suspected terrorist activity, or to identify possible terrorist vulnerabilities within the 
community. 
Fixed Geographic Accountability and Generalist Responsibilities 
 In community policing, most staffing, supervision, deployment, and tactical decision-
making are geographically based.  Personnel are assigned to fixed geographic areas for 
extended periods of time in order to foster communication and partnerships between 
individual officers and their community.  Having fixed-geographic responsibility allows 
officers to develop more productive relationships with members of their community and, as a 
result, officers should be more attuned to rising levels of community concern and fear.  By 
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virtue of these relationships, officers should be in a position to respond effectively to those 
needs and concerns.  Community policing engenders trust and increases satisfaction among 
community members and police, which in periods of heightened unrest or crisis can translate 
to dealing more effectively with community fear.
16
 
Utilizing Volunteer Resources 
After the events of September 11, 2001, the idea of involving citizens in crime prevention 
has taken on new significance, with President Bush calling for greater citizen involvement in 
homeland security through initiatives such as Citizen Corps and Freedom Corps.
17
 President 
Bush created these programs so Americans could participate directly in homeland security 
efforts in their own communities.  This network of volunteer efforts uses the foundations 
already established by law enforcement in order to prepare local communities to respond 
effectively to the threats of terrorism and crime.  In addition to creating the Citizens Corps 
and Freedom Corps, the president’s plan is to enhance community-policing programs already 
in place, such as Neighborhood Watch, by incorporating terrorism prevention into its 
mission.  
 Community policing encourages the use of non-law enforcement resources within a law 
enforcement agency such as volunteerism, which involves active citizen participation with 
their law enforcement agency.  Volunteer efforts can help free up officer time, and provide 
an effective channel for citizen input.  It has long been recognized that many of the basic 
functions within a law enforcement agency can be accomplished by other than sworn 
deputies or civilian employees.  Volunteer efforts can help free up officer time, and allow 
sworn personnel to be more proactive and prevention-oriented.  In many jurisdictions around 
the country, citizens who have the time to volunteer in the community have offered their 
services to law enforcement agencies, freeing up law enforcement personnel to spend more 
time in a crime reduction role.   
This community policing element dovetails perfectly with President Bush’s Citizen 
Corps, which was developed to “harness the power of every individual through education, 
training, and volunteer service to make communities safer, stronger, and better prepared to 
respond to threats of terrorism, crime, public health issues, and disasters of all kinds.”
18
 
There are four programs in Citizen Corps: Neighborhood Watch, Volunteers in Police 
Service (VIPS), Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), and Medical Reserve 
Corps (MRC), all of which integrate well with the community policing philosophy. In fact, 
Neighborhood Watch has been an integral component of the community policing philosophy 
virtually since its inception.   
Neighborhood Watch 
 This crime prevention program, which has a thirty-year history, engages volunteer citizen 
action to enhance security within local communities by encouraging citizens to report 
suspicious activity in their immediate neighborhoods.  Citizen Corps hopes to double the 
number of neighborhood watch programs, while incorporating terrorism prevention into the 
program’s mission. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the need for strengthening and 
securing our communities has become even more critical, and Neighborhood Watch groups 
have taken on greater significance. In addition to serving a crime prevention role, 
Neighborhood Watch can also be used as the basis for bringing neighborhood residents 
together to focus on disaster preparedness as well as terrorism awareness, to focus on 
evacuation drills and exercises, and even to organize group training, such as the Community 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) training.
19
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Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS) 
 This program provides training for civilian volunteers who assist local police departments 
by performing “non-sworn” duties, effectively freeing up officers to spend more time on 
critical functions.  Since September 11, 2001, the demands on state and local law 
enforcement have increased dramatically. As a result, already-limited resources are being 
stretched farther at a time when our country needs every available officer out on the beat.  
The program provides resources to assist local law enforcement officials by incorporating 
community volunteers into the activities of the law enforcement agency and by using best 
practices to help state and local law enforcement design strategies to recruit, train, and utilize 
citizen volunteers in their departments.
20
 
Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) 
 This program provides civilians with training in emergency management planning and 
response functions to bolster the capacity of local communities to respond to disasters.  
President Bush has proposed a three-fold increase, to 400,000, of the number of citizens 
enrolled in CERT.  Since its move into Citizen Corps, the program has added a new module 
that addresses terrorism preparedness. When emergencies happen, CERT members can give 
critical support to first responders, provide immediate assistance to victims, and organize 
spontaneous volunteers at a disaster site. CERT members can also help with non-emergency 
projects that help improve the safety of the community.
21
 
Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) 
 The Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) Program coordinates the skills of practicing and 
retired physicians, nurses, and other health professionals as well as other citizens interested 
in health issues who are eager to volunteer to address their community’s ongoing public 
health needs and to help their community during large-scale emergency situations.  Local 
community leaders develop their own Medical Reserve Corps Units and identify the duties of 
the MRC volunteers according to specific community needs. For example, MRC volunteers 
may deliver necessary public health services during a crisis, assist emergency response teams 
with patients, and provide care directly to those with less serious injuries and other health-
related issues.  The Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) plays an integral part in our preparedness 
and response strategy. It provides an organized way for medical and public health volunteers 
to offer their skills and expertise during local crises and throughout the year.
22
 
PROBLEM SOLVING TACTICS APPLIED TO HOMELAND SECURITY 
Through programs such as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), 
intelligence gathering, information sharing, and the use of GIS mapping and analysis, law 
enforcement can identify and conduct security assessments of critical infrastructure and other 
important private sector facilities.  Security assessments can identify which facilities have the 
greatest potential as targets. Once identified, detailed risk management and crisis plans can 
be developed and implemented.  The goal of problem solving in community-oriented 
policing is a fundamental shift from traditional reactive policing to one that preemptively 
reduces a facility’s vulnerability to a terrorist attack. 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
 Basic principles of CPTED include target hardening (controlling access to neighborhoods 
and buildings and conducting surveillance on specific areas to reduce opportunities for crime 
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to occur) and territorial reinforcement (increasing the sense of security in settings where 
people live and work through activities that encourage informal control of the environment). 
 Local agencies will have to get involved in community planning through programs like 
CPTED to ensure that future growth and construction of facilities minimizes the vulnerability 
to terrorist acts.  The conceptual thrust of CPTED is that the physical environment can be 
manipulated by design to produce behavioral effects that will reduce the incidence and fear 
of crime, thereby improving the quality of life.  These behavioral effects can be 




 For years, local law enforcement agencies have complained about federal agencies failing 
to appreciate the role of law enforcement in intelligence activities.  At a time when 
asymmetric terrorist threats pose some of the biggest threats to our communities, however, 
we cannot afford not to have local law enforcement more fully integrated into the National 
Homeland Security Strategy. 
The challenge here will be two-fold.  First, it will require a philosophical change in federal 
law enforcement to break down the barriers of compartmentalization and accept local 
agencies as full partners in the national security intelligence infrastructure. Secondly, local 
agencies need to receive the necessary training and analytical resources.  The challenge will 
come not in obtaining additional human resources, but in training existing personnel to 
recognize information or behavior of individuals or groups of possible threats, and the ability 
to disseminate that information with others in a manner that would allow for the intervention 
of any future terrorist acts. 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Mapping and Analysis 
Many of the innovations implemented through community-oriented policing require a 
geographic focus, and emphasize the importance of integrating GIS mapping technology into 
problem-solving strategies.  Technological advances in computer mapping have propelled 
crime mapping and analysis to the forefront of crime prevention and community policing.  
Computerized crime mapping allows law enforcement agencies to plot crime data against a 
digitized map of a community, city, or region.  Crime-related data can then be compared and 




Since September 11th, it has become apparent that Homeland Security is not an effort that 
can be conducted by law enforcement alone.  Instead, an effective Homeland Security 
strategy must include partnerships not only with other law enforcement organizations, but 
also with businesses, citizens, emergency management, public health, and many other private 
and public organizations with a stake in terrorism prevention and response.  Partnerships 
need to be expanded to take advantage of the many skills necessary to plan for, mobilize, and 
respond to terrorist acts.  For homeland security, this means building trust with Arab-
American and Islamic-American communities, not with empty promises but by 
demonstrating how law enforcement can protect them in their neighborhoods, workplaces, 
places of worship, and other public spaces.
25
 
There is often some misconception that in community-oriented policing, “community” is 
defined by certain geographical boundaries.  Daniel Flynn suggests that law enforcement 
agencies look beyond traditional geographical boundaries and that agencies also look at areas 
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or groups with shared character or identity and those with common problems or concerns.  
Flynn points to ethnic, cultural, and racial communities, as well as businesses, schools, and 
churches.
26
 In community-oriented policing, the police are only one of the many local 
government organizations responsible for responding to community problems.  In 
community-oriented policing, other government agencies are called upon and recognized for 
their abilities to respond to crime and social disorder issues.  Community-based organizations 
also are brought into crime prevention and problem solving partnerships with law 
enforcement.  Encouraging citizen involvement in programs such as neighborhood watch, 
youth education, and other activities with law enforcement has been found to increase social 
cohesion among citizens and decrease fear of crime.
27
 The emphasis on building community 




The prevention of terrorist activities requires not only effective communication between 
local and state agencies and the federal government but, perhaps more importantly, with the 
community. By building community partnerships facilitated by community policing, law 
enforcement can develop responses aimed at reducing levels of fear.  While citizen fear of 
terrorist events is somewhat different from fear of crime, some of the same techniques and 
programs can be used in its reduction. Citizen awareness campaigns can inform citizens 
about what police and government are doing to prepare for and prevent a future attack.
29
 
Working with the Media 
 In any terrorism strategy, the media will play a crucial role in defining the nature, scope, 
and level of threat in critical situations, in disseminating information, and in calming the 
population.  According to Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in 
Countering Terrorism, one way to blunt the “behavioral, attitudinal, and emotional 




Through relationships and partnerships cultivated with reporters and producers, the local 
media will look to law enforcement as an important partner in delivering accurate and 
relevant information to the public.  While government cannot control how people will react 
to a terror attack, officials can help shape attitudes and behaviors by providing helpful 
information as well as seek assistance in obtaining information that may be relevant in the 
prevention or investigation of a terrorist incident.  Making information available about 
measures taken to prevent or defend against an attack will give citizens a greater sense of 
control over uncertain situations and tend to lower the level of public fear.
31
 
Neighborhood Watch, Business Watch and Worship Watch Programs 
 Neighborhood Watch as a crime prevention tool has been in place around the country for 
many years.  Recognizing that the detection of criminal activity is not a job law enforcement 
can do alone, Neighborhood Watch has served as extra eyes and ears in the community to 
report suspicious activity or crimes to law enforcement. As the detection of suspicious 
behavior is an integral part of homeland security, using this already established program 
should be part of an agency’s overall homeland security effort.  Through the Neighborhood 
Watch program, law enforcement can: 
• Act as a liaison with each current Neighborhood Watch group.  This includes developing 
more efficient methods of communication between law enforcement and these groups in 
order to provide a better exchange of up-to-date crime prevention and homeland security 
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information.  In turn, the interest level of Watch members would increase and keep groups 
active. 
• Recruit new Neighborhood Watch groups.  Experience has shown that in areas where 
Neighborhood Watch groups are active, crime is generally lower and support for law 
enforcement higher.  
• Review daily all crime-related calls for service records in their assigned area. Police 
officers will be looking to identify problems areas that can be addressed with prevention 
efforts.  This includes working with crime analysts and district enforcement personnel 
seeking unified approaches in reducing crime by prevention. 
• Meet with crime victims and other citizens to offer services to reduce their potential of 
becoming a victim in the future.  The main activity supporting this task is conducting 
crime prevention programs and security surveys to residential areas.  
• Act as a conduit for homeland security initiatives to encourage citizens to be observant 
and watchful by reporting things that seem unusual or out of place.  
 Managers and business owners make risk management decisions for their businesses 
every day.  These risks encourage them to seek new opportunities to profit.   Allowing crime 
an opportunity to exist is not one of these risks, since no chance for profit exists when crime 
is present.  Crime results in monetary loss, inventory loss, and a loss to the reputation of the 
business.  Most importantly, crime can impact the personal safety of employees and their 
customers. This makes crime prevention good for business from both a human and financial 
standpoint. 
The Business Watch Program is modeled after the Neighborhood Watch Program and 
establishes a formal communication network between law enforcement and businesses 
countywide.  Business members are alerted to the potential of crime and are encouraged to 
look out for the community. 
Law enforcement can provide members with training to educate owners, managers, and 
employees to be able to recognize and report any suspicious activities or crimes. Such 
training ranges from preventing shoplifting and robbery to learning how to be a good 
witness, and many other topics.  The key focus of each deputy is the delivery of proactive 
crime prevention and homeland security services to the business community.  
Worship Watch was originally designed to bring crime prevention awareness and law 
enforcement services to all religious communities regardless of their religious beliefs by 
providing programs on personal safety, home security, drug awareness, auto theft, and many 
other subjects of interest to the public.  Since September 11
th
 special emphasis has been 
placed upon religious institutions that, as a result of current world events, may be at a greater 
threat level because of their religious beliefs. 
Citizen Academies 
 Community-oriented policing is based on the premise that citizens should be empowered 
to enhance their quality of life and prevent or eliminate crime and the problems that lead to 
crime.
32
 Everyone benefits when community members understand the role and function of 
their police department and become active proponents of law enforcement.
33
 One such 
initiative used by law enforcement agencies is the citizen academy.  Citizen academies have 
been effective in educating members of the community about the mission, goals, objectives, 
and programs of the police department.  Citizen academies should be expanded to address the 
issue of terrorism and the role that the community can play in assisting law enforcement with 
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information gathering, identification of target vulnerabilities, and volunteer opportunities 
directly supporting the homeland security strategy. 
 
HOMELAND POLICING 
For the past ten years, community-oriented policing has served as the impetus for law 
enforcement agencies to establish a closer relationship with citizens to identify threats within 
the community that create a climate of fear and social disorder.  The emphasis in community 
policing on community involvement and problem solving clearly establishes a solid 
foundation upon which homeland security efforts should be built.  At a time when local law 
enforcement agencies have to deal with additional homeland security responsibilities and 
shrinking budgets, there could be a tendency to reduce community policing efforts, which are 
still often thought of as a “frill.” Under these circumstances, it is important that law 
enforcement agencies not revert to the “traditional” approach to policing. Instead of de-
emphasizing community-oriented policing efforts, law enforcement agencies must realize 
that a strong community-oriented policing philosophy within the agency provides a strong 
basis for preventing and responding to terrorism and its goal of creating fear in the 
community.  Local law enforcement must realize that their efforts are integral to any national 
homeland security strategy and that community-oriented policing could be their most 
effective strategy in dealing with terrorism prevention and response in their community. 
The “homeland-policing” model presented here suggests that the existing community 
policing model does serve as an effective framework for the development of an effective 
prevention strategy for homeland security by local law enforcement agencies. Results of a 
2004 survey of all local law enforcement agencies in the state of Florida showed that a 
significant correlation exists between what agencies do in their day-to-day activities with 
respect to community policing and homeland security.  For example, agencies that use GIS to 
conduct crime mapping and analysis also frequently use GIS to conduct terrorism target 
mapping and analysis, and agencies that use their web site to disseminate crime prevention 
information also frequently use it to disseminate homeland security information.  In short, 
results showed that factors associated with adopting a community policing philosophy among 
agencies and implementing homeland security strategies within agencies are highly related.34 
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security measures. For this reason, military and security planners must embrace a more
flexible, comprehensive, and comprehensible approach to contingency planning – a method
based on neither threats nor scenarios exclusively, but rather on integrating these two
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INTRODUCTION: The Vital Task of Planning for the Worst 
“Within a few hours [on September 11, 2001], the threats to our world had become exponentially 
more complex,” the New York City Fire Commissioner concluded in the FDNY Strategic Plan 
2004-2005, “[and] the Fire Department, in turn, needed to adapt.”
1
The challenge for homeland 
defense and homeland security organizations is uncertainty as to what to adapt to, with a threat 
being too ambiguous and diverse to easily identify. For military planners at United States 
Northern Command, counter-terrorism planners at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
and strategic planners in police and fire departments, there are many questions: What exactly is 
the threat? What part of this threat is our responsibility? What capabilities will we need to detect 
and to stop these threats? The next concern is often the perplexing question: how do I explain 
this plan to my boss? Because terrorist threat actors are both cunning and adaptive, relying on 
surprise to overcome security measures, military and security planners must embrace a more 
flexible, comprehensive, and comprehensible approach to contingency planning – a method 
based on neither threats nor scenarios exclusively, but rather on integrating  these two 
approaches into a planning process based on capabilities. 
The process of contingency planning and resource allocation poses one of the greatest current 
challenges for those responsible for protecting the United States because of the severity and 
diversity of the threats and the required timeliness of any defensive operations and security 
responses. The National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes this by designating “manage 
risks and allocate resources judiciously” as guiding principles and goes on to declare, “because 
the number of potential terrorist acts is nearly infinite, we must make difficult choices about how 
to allocate resources against those risks that pose the greatest danger to our homeland.”
2
At this 
task, military and security planners have struggled to develop a comprehensive and 
comprehensible planning system using existing approaches of traditional threat-based planning 
that focus on the “who,” and scenario-based planning that address the “what.” To present senior 
decision-makers with timely and effective contingency plans, planners need to transition to a 
more flexible and dynamic capabilities-based planning method that focuses on the “how” and 
can thus frame required capabilities and overcome uncertainty concerning the threat. 
 
PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT PLANNING METHODOLOGIES 
The National Security Strategy identifies the vital function of having a formal and deliberate 
process of threat assessment, yet such process has yet to gain wide acceptance. Conceptually, 
there are three fundamental approaches to conducting a threat assessment, focusing on the 
“who,” the “what,” and the “how” of the threat. In a traditional threat assessment, analysts 
address the “who” of the threat: the threat actor(s), their “order of battle,” and their most likely 
courses of action. The second conceptual approach looks at the “what” of the threat: what part of 
the threat is a specific agency’s responsibility to defeat, and what aspect of the threat planners 
should address through threat scenarios. 
One of the critical products for decision-makers in concept development is the “intelligence 
estimate” or “threat assessment.” As current DOD doctrine asserts, “intelligence should provide 
the commander with an understanding of the adversary in terms of the adversary’s probable 
intent, objectives, strengths, weaknesses, probable course-of-action, most dangerous course-of-
action, values, and critical vulnerabilities.”
3
Based on this threat assessment and strategic 
guidance, planners develop a single course of action with branches and sequels. This traditional 
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planning process results in decision-makers selecting a single contingency plan with a “throw the 
switch” type of action. Traditional military planning process can thus be seen as a single decision 
chain, which was effective during the relatively stable strategic environment of the Cold War 
when even complex plans for major theater wars could go years with only slight modifications. 
However appropriate this traditional approach is for a threat like the North Korean military, 
threat-based planning produces only guesses in the face of state-sponsored and non-state threat 
actors that the U.S. faces currently. This is due, in turn, to such things as a dearth of intelligence 
on Al Qaeda’s organizational structure and operational capabilities. Without knowing how many 
“cells” are operating, how they receive operational guidance, and where specifically they plan to 
strike, planners have little on which to build plans. While intelligence successes in the global war 
or terrorism have been filling in the blanks on many such questions, the absence of a template 
will continue to frustrate those who seek to apply a traditional “who” approach to the 
unprecedented threats to the United States.  Taking a traditional threat-based planning approach 
in an asymmetric and unprecedented threat environment can be inherently frustrating because of 
the absence of enough hard intelligence and results in continued inability to template a terrorist 
“order of battle” or determine courses of action. 
After 9/11, many homeland security planners tried a different approach to contingency 
planning by using a “scenario-based” planning process that focused on what events could 
happen. This approach was based on “what if” drills that postulated a limited number of threat 
actions and then wargamed agency responsibilities for potential counters. The process of this 
scenario-based approach was best seen at the Salt Lake City Olympics, and shows the 
advantages of this method of planning: it is simple to execute and modifiable based on the 
scenarios selected. These “what if” contingency plans have the additional benefit of not requiring 
a detailed threat assessment, as issues and questions concerning the threat can be mitigated by 
making assumptions to fit the scenario. Though conceptually simple, and therefore attractive for 
initial planning efforts, this approach does have weaknesses because effective “scenario-based” 
planning requires certainty about possible scenarios and a limited number of scenarios to plan 
against.  
An inherent problem with this “what if” method is unavoidable: scenario-based planning 
produces plans only for the contingency scenarios selected. These problems were revealed in 
2002 when DOD facilitated a Homeland Security and Homeland Defense series of tabletop 
exercises to wargame existing contingency plans in what became known as the “Nine 
Scenarios.” The goal of this planning exercise was to clarify DOD responsibilities during the 
establishment of the DHS. During initial meetings, there was little agreement as to what 
scenarios to utilize because of lack of consensus on the most likely “what ifs” – a return to the 
need for “actionable intelligence” to discern what, how, and where the terrorists were going to 
strike next. As a result, nine very broad scenarios such as “attack on a port” and “biological 
attack” were selected, and multiple branches and variations of each scenario were developed. 
The process was reduced to a discussion of what would be the most challenging scenarios (a 
lengthy list of extreme contingencies) and a conscious dismissal of any attempt to determine a 
limited and manageable number of likely “what if” contingencies. The end result was 
disagreement on reasonable scenarios and little progress on wargaming and planning due to an 
inability to get past discussions on the scenarios themselves. This is precisely what planners are 
told to avoid: “fighting the scenario.” 
The DHS recently attempted to overcome this challenge by formalizing a set of standard 
threat scenarios. This form of “universal threat” planning is designed to be the foundation for the 
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development of all “national preparedness standards from which homeland security capabilities 
can be measured.”
4
Because of the current counter-terrorism focus and concern for potential 
mass casualty attacks, DHS introduced a formal threat baseline of “threat scenarios” that city 
planners are to use to evaluate their current level of manning, equipping, and planning for 
prevention and recovery capacity. While utilizing a scenario-based planning process, even the 
introduction to these “planning scenarios” stresses the need for capabilities-based planning and 
“for domestic incident preparedness to proceed through a capabilities-based approach.”
5
This effort has run into resistance from homeland security planners who claim that “one size 
does not fit all.” The scenario-based approach makes claims of flexibility with “ways that allow 
them to be adapted to local conditions,” but offers a framework of set tasks and agency roles that 
cannot be easily modified.
6
City planners and decision-makers are quick to point out that each 
city is in fact unique in its infrastructure, assets, resources, and vulnerability. The challenge for 
any scenario-based approach is to be able to plan with certainty that the scenarios developed will 
be the scenarios faced. That certainty is a rare and perishable commodity in the diverse planning 
community that addresses the multifaceted and ambiguous threats to the U.S. Homeland. 
Therefore, neither “threat-based” nor “scenario-based” planning will work effectively for 
homeland defense or homeland security planning because the asymmetric threat cannot be used 
as a template.
7
Advocates of capabilities-based planning assert that it is this strong potential for 
the threat to achieve surprise by asymmetric means that makes threat-based and scenario-based 
planning a poor match for the needs of emerging planning challenges like homeland defense and 
homeland security. This is because: 
• Threat-based planning is very susceptible to threat deception, causing the U.S. to 
mischaracterize and often underestimate the threat; 
• Planners traditionally tend to “mirror image” threats when little hard intelligence is available 
which is only effective for symmetric threats; 
• Large bureaucracies like DOD tend toward “group think” and discourage the unconventional 
thinking required to understand and assess asymmetric threats;  
• Resource constraints tend to focus time and money on traditional big ticket weapons systems 
and discourage development of capabilities for the “unproven” asymmetric threats.
8
The memories of 9/11 and the fears of unprecedented terrorist capabilities combine with these 
uncertainties to drive homeland defense and homeland security planners to search for a planning 
process that avoids these pitfalls. 
 
DEVELOPING A CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING METHODOLOGY 
To address the perceived growing complexity of the global security situation for the United 
States, the Department of Defense (DOD) is advocating “capabilities-based” defense planning to 
achieve a broad portfolio of military capabilities that will perform robustly in uncertain future 
environments.
9
As first formalized in the 2001 DOD Quadrennial Defense Review, a
capabilities-based approach “focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than 
specifically whom the adversary might be or where a war might occur.”
10
 To accomplish this 
broad goal, DOD planning focuses on strategic planning and is expressed in the newest Defense 
Planning Scenarios used to predict future contingencies. Strategic documents at DOD (e.g. 
Strategic Planning Guidance, Contingency Planning Guidance, and National Military Strategy)
have started adopting this concept by focusing planning “on how adversaries will fight in the 
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future rather than on which specific adversaries we may fight.” While not formalizing any 
definition of what the words “capabilities-based planning” mean (much less how to do it), each 
document addresses capabilities-based planning as a goal and a mechanism to overcome the 
nebulous nature of the strategic environment. 
The genesis for this approach to planning was strategic thinking at the RAND Corporation’s 
National Defense Research Institute. The author of much of the conceptual work behind the 
current push for capabilities-based planning is Paul K. Davis at RAND, who defines capabilities-
based planning as “planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range 
of modern-day challenges and circumstances, while working within an economic framework.”
11
 
Though focused on DOD force structure planning rather than campaign planning, Davis believes 
this new approach to Defense planning is not antithetical to threat-based planning, nor does it 
solely signify a shift in emphasis from threat to capabilities. Rather, it satisfies the need for 
increasing variability in Defense planning cases and in the key planning factors for friendly and 
enemy forces, to better account for uncertainty. For this approach, the question “who is the 
threat?” is addressed as a reworded question “what could the threat do?” to allow exploration of 
a much broader range of eventualities.
12
 This helps planners to define capabilities needed rather 
than individual numerical solutions to narrowly defined, highly scripted individual cases because 
capabilities-based planning treats the threat as a continuum, within prescribed limits, rather than 
as a set of single-point values.   
A working definition of “Capabilities-Based Planning” modifies these initial DOD and RAND 
characterizations in order to address the requirements of homeland defense and homeland 
security contingency planning for a flexible process that resembles a conceptual “menu” 
approach to planning. A capabilities-based planning process can therefore be defined as an 
analytical process of assessing strike means, capacity, and likelihood of all potentially hostile 
actors, with an emphasis on recasting intelligence uncertainty into a modular “menu” of potential 
threat capabilities. This planning process results in a solution framework emphasizing “building 
blocks” of capabilities that could be tailored to meet persistent general threats or a specific 
emerging threat.
13
 By bracketing potential hostile capacities with assumptions of likelihood, 
planners can define and codify amorphous threats, develop a list of required capabilities and 
required authorities and policies to counter anticipated enemy actions, and retain flexibility in 
response to changes in the strategic threat environment.  Each new piece of new intelligence 
further refines what threat capabilities exist and any “actionable intelligence” triggers the 
execution of pre-planned defense and security capabilities already identified and enabled. 
Additionally, because the objective of any planning process is to facilitate senior level 
decision-making on resource allocation and risk assessments, both the process and the resulting 
plan must be clear to senior decision-makers. This ensures both senior leader involvement and 
the ability to make sound choices. By leveraging senior leader involvement, a comprehensible 
planning process should also clearly identify risks and recommendations on mitigation strategies 
to increase chances of success. The result of this planning process also must provide a linkage 
between the plan and required resources to identify decision points to decision-makers. The last 
requirement of an effective plan is a linkage between the plan and the organization’s exercise 
and training program to provide the mechanism to validate and modify the plan. 
 
DEVELOPING A CAPABILITIES-BASED THREAT ASSESSMENT 
A new conceptual approach that combines the strengths of threat-based and scenario-based 
thinking needs to be found to structure and assess threats in homeland security and homeland 
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defense contingency planning. A solution to this challenge can be found in the concepts of “lines 
of operation” and “capabilities” as dynamics to define and explain potential and likely 
interactions. As opposed to the spatial or temporal divisions of the battle space by borders, or 
domains like air and seas, and phasing like build-up, defense, and offense, homeland defense 
campaigns are shaped by a reactive concept to threat actions and the division of the threat into 
potential lines of operation. “Lines of operation” are defined by the Department of Defense as 
“lines that define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the 
enemy.”
14
 For homeland defense and homeland security operations, these lines of operation can 
be modified to address distinct and related methods of both attack and defense such as “maritime 
attacks” or “attacks on continuity of government.” 
These lines of operation for the threat can then be defined and depicted in terms of specific 
capabilities. The Department of Defense dictionary defines a “capability” as “the ability to 
execute a specific course of action (a capability may or may not be accompanied by an 
intention).”
15
 Having a capability implies the ability to perform a set of tasks required to 
accomplish the mission requiring the capability. This intentionally very broad definition covers 
both capabilities involved in strategic organizational issues (like force sizing and procurement) 
and operational issues (such as tactics and weapon performance). For this article, a capability is 
defined as the ability to perform a specified task within the conditions and performance standards 
accepted for that mission set. Therefore, the capability to conduct a “swarm boat attack” includes 
the ability to plan and execute multiple simultaneous attacks on maritime targets using small 
boats with an expectation of causing significant damage to the targets. However, it is important 
to highlight that this does not imply that the group with this capability has the plan or the intent 
to use this specific capability in their next attack. 
 
HLD Traditional
Threats:      ASSESSMENT 
• State X 
• State Y 
• Actor H 
• Actor Hz 
• Actor AQ 
?
HLD Capabilities-Based
Threats:       ASSESSMENT 
• State X 
• State Y 
• Actor H 
• Actor Hz 
• Actor AQ
Threat Capabilities (“How”)
Threat Lines of Operation: ASSESSMENT
• Missile 
• Terrorism 
• Conventional Air 
• Asymmetric Air 
• Conventional Maritime 
• Asymmetric Maritime
Figure 1 
A Capabilities-Based Approach to Threat Assessment 
In terms of identifying the threat, this “how” approach aims to produce a matrix of possible 
(and likely) threat capabilities that need to be countered by assessing the threat by capability and 
not by group or actor (see Figure 1). For example, with multiple actors possessing the means and 
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the will to conduct terrorism in the U.S. Homeland, the focus of assessment is not Al Qaeda, but 
any potential terrorist group; i.e., what terrorist acts (or capabilities) are possible? Now the 
question becomes manageable within current information limits because the intelligence analysts 
are no longer predicting what or where Al Qaeda will strike next, but how any terrorist could 
strike. In this manner, a capabilities-based threat assessment is done by first assessing what types 
of threat lines of operation are possible to bring threat capabilities against the U.S. ( ballistic 
missiles? terrorism? air attack?). Then for each type of threat faced, threat lines of operation or 
“red lines” of threat capabilities can be developed to identify specific methods to deliver threat 
capabilities. Even this rudimentary level of analysis can assist planners in providing a framework 
for the threat environment. The combination of “lines of operations” and “capabilities” inherent 
in capabilities-based planning allows an intellectual structure to address the many challenges in 






















Developing Threat Lines of Operation and Threat Capabilities 
The same assessment can then be done for each threat type to identify possible hostile 
capabilities. In building these threat lines of operation, or “red lines,” intelligence can be used, 
not to dictate what exactly trans-national terrorist groups and rogue states are most likely to do, 
but rather to determine the range of possibilities – the maximum and minimum threat each group 
poses to the U.S. Homeland (see Figure 2). For example, the threat of ballistic missiles is both 
complex (due to the technical nature of the method) and well-understood (due to the limited 
number of threat actors and the physics involved). However, what exactly is the threat? If the 
threat of strategic attack is developed as a threat capability type, a relatively simple example of a 
threat line of operation emerges. Even though missile defense rests on hard data of numbers and 
ranges, developing a maximum and minimum limit to this threat “red line” helps frame the 
answer to the threat question and helps missile defense planners by scoping the challenge (and 
defining the required homeland defense capability). For example, the minimum threat to the U.S. 
Homeland is not zero (the potential for accidental launch or North Korean strategic 
miscalculation ensures that) and the maximum is not the combined strategic arsenals of China, 
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France, Great Britain, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia. While intelligence 
information may reveal glimpses of the ideology and goals of various threat actors, the simple 
formula of “threat ideology plus capabilities equals likely targets and courses of action” cannot 
be used as a tool for threat assessment because ideology is difficult to assess and often can lead 
to simple – and incorrect – predictions of threat actions.  
Problems with an ideological approach can surface on two levels during the threat assessment. 
First, a single group’s ideology (often the group judged to be the most dangerous) can be 
superimposed on all threats, artificially narrowing potential threat courses of action and possibly 
overlooking equally likely capabilities. For example, the perceived aim of Al Qaeda is often 
offered as achieving the goals of “fundamental Islamists,” but the numerous diverse groups 
under this label have disparate and often contradictory ideological objectives. Additionally, there 
is the complex and difficult problem of accurately determining a threat group’s ideology from 
the outside, based on partial and limited information. For these reasons, the key for a viable 
assessment framework is to focus broadly across potential threats rather than on the perceived 
ideology of a single threat actor.  
By building a spectrum of specific and distinct threat capabilities along a single line of 
operation, analysis of current intelligence on each threat actor can help to define what constitutes 
“likely” threats and anticipated means of attack, and can shape the minimum and maximum of 
the threat along the developing threat “red line” (see Figure 3). Intelligence can also guide the 
designation of a “most likely” attack method for each group and a collective “most likely” 
capability (seen in the red diamond on the threat “red line”) for the entire threat line of operation. 
The result is a coherent and comprehensive threat assessment for a threat such as the notional 
“transnational air attack” line of operation depicted in Figure 4. Bracketing potential hostile 
capacities with assumptions of likelihood facilitates narrowing planning into manageable (and 
often affordable and acceptable) realms. Other possible threat capabilities associated with this 
threat type – regardless of which threat actor processes this capability or method of attack – are 
then posited between these assumed limits. 
 
Figure 3 
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This “how” process also has the advantage of being conceptually simple, though complex and 
detailed in practice and open to constant conceptual refinement. An example of a simplified (and 
notional) capabilities-based threat assessment can be seen in the transnational air attack threat 
line of operation in Figure 4. This line of operation for the threat would be built to include all 
unconventional asymmetric air threats aimed at the U.S. Homeland, but tailored for the 
responsibility and role of the organization conducting the assessment. In this way, while each 
numbered capability point is subject to challenge and dissection, the holistic nature of the threat 
and what needs to be countered are graphically represented. Then current intelligence on various 
threat actors would determine the most likely threat threshold as seen by the red diamond 
depicted as capability G7. The “transnational air attack” line of operation (if conducted with 
actual intelligence available), would answer questions regarding the threat while being flexible to 
changing conditions on threat actors, intent, and capabilities.  
 
Figure 4 
 Example of Capabilities-Based Threat Assessments (Illustrative Purpose Only) 
This capabilities-based approach to threat assessment can also work for Homeland Security-
type threats where agency responsibilities overlap. An example of a simplified capabilities-based 
homeland security threat assessment can be seen in the transnational threat line of operation 
involving land attacks as depicted in Figure 5. In this example, eight threat capabilities are 
determined to be the potential “how” the enemy might attack and the three lowest magnitude 
capabilities (H1, H2, H3) are determined to be the most likely. This threshold “red diamond” of 
assessed probability can be adjusted by intelligence “chatter” or perceived changes in 
vulnerabilities (for example, during a special event). While focusing planners on the most likely 
threat, this capabilities-based assessment also depicts other, less-likely threats (H4 – H8) that 
must be addressed in contingency planning due to their greater magnitude and potential impact. 
While greatly oversimplified, these “red line” examples show enough assessment of the threat 
that planners can identify and develop defensive lines of operation and capabilities needed to 






“Transnational air attack” includes all air threats originating inside the 
US (includes terrorism and asymmetric attacks)
Most Likely
Threat Capability Parameters:
• G1  Single UAV / Remote Control Aircraft (A/C)  kinetic attack with intel warning
• G2 Single small General Aviation Aircraft (GAA) kinetic attack with intel warning
• G3 Single cruise missile attack, with High-Explosive (HE) with intel warning
• G4 Single hijack GAA / cargo A/C kinetic attack with intel warning
• G5 Large hijack A/C Kinetic attack, outside National Capital Region (NCR), limited warning 
• G6 Multiple hijack GAA / cargo A/C kinetic attack with intel warning
• G7 Large hijack A/C Kinetic attack, in NCR, limited warning
• G8 Limited cruise missile attack, with Chem / Bio with limited warning
• G9 Large A/C Kinetic attack, with Chem / RDD in NCR, limited warning
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Figure 5  
Example of Capabilities-Based Threat Assessments (Illustrative Purpose Only) 
While this “how” assessment is a distinct process from traditional approaches to threat 
assessment, this focus on threat capabilities integrates the strengths of threat-based (“who”) and 
responsibilities-based (“what”) approaches. From threat-based, all available hard data on the 
threat can be integrated into an assessment of likely capabilities and maximum and minimum 
threats. This threat-based data is also required to define what each capability entails and its 
capacities and limitations (for example, defining what constitutes a “Vehicle Borne Improvised 
Explosive Device” or “VBIED” and what its possible delivery means). Additionally, assessments 
of current intelligence indicators and hostile leadership communications can focus efforts on 
certain threat lines and certain threat capabilities. As a result, the knowledge of the threat from a 
“threat-based” approach can be integrated into the proposed approach in the development of 
likelihood of the use of threat capacities and in determining the limits of these threat capabilities. 
At the same time, each threat capability addressed on a threat line of operation (“red line”) can 
be seen as an individual scenario that can be wargamed within a larger framework. Integrating 
the value of this type of “what” approach, each threat capability (i.e., capability point on a threat 
“red line”) can be exercised as a possible scenario for planners and senior leaders to wargame 
agency responsibilities and required authorities.  Certain “red lines” and threat capabilities can be 
identified as being a specific agency’s responsibility because these assumptions have now been 
formalized and a mechanism identified to validate these divisions of responsibility. In this way, 
capabilities-based threat assessment is a viable and synergistic process of answering the simple 
and fundamental question “what is the threat?” by focusing on “how” a threat could attack the 
U.S. Homeland. Furthermore, this process is scalable and the resulting assessments could be as 






“Transnational land attack” includes unconventional / asymmetric
threats to sites / facilities (includes CBRNE and terrorism)
Most Likely
Threat Capability Parameters:
• H1 Sabotage to facility with intel warning
• H2 Shooting at single facility with intel warning
• H3 Single vehicle bomb at facility, with intel warning
• H4 Coordinated suicide bombers, non-NCR, with intel warning
• H5 Single MANPAD attack on aircraft, with intel warning
• H6 Coordinated Chem / RDD attack, with intel warning
• H7 Single Chem / RDD attack, limited warning
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DEVELOPING A CAPABILITIES-BASED MENU OF OPTIONS 
The key to the capabilities-based plan is a direct linkage between threat capabilities and required 
friendly capabilities to counter them. As the threat has been assessed into a set number of 
capabilities and defined with a minimum and maximum potential threat, the friendly line of 
operation required to counter the threat can be bounded into a similar set of capabilities bounded 
by the same minimum and maximum as depicted in Figure 6. Then, each threat capability is 
examined to determine what can be done to negate this capability and prevent its successful 
execution by treating each as a distinct and individual threat scenario. For each specific threat 
capability to be successfully executed, certain threat actions must be taken in sequence 
concerning planning, preparation, transit, and execution, all of which can be wargamed even 
with a limited amount of knowledge. From this discrete and defined scenario of potential threat 
actions, an individual “blue” capability plan can be. The parameters of each capability data point 
can be expressed as planned protective and preemptive measures directed generically against the 
possible threat attack method. 
 
Figure 6 
Capabilities-Based Planning Concept 
While the intelligence assessment of threat capabilities sets the red diamond (likely threat), 
the experience and judgment of senior decision-makers establish the appropriate blue diamond or 
“planning threshold.” This is not simply a matter of matching the anticipated likelihood of threat 
attacks. Decision-makers may decide either to over-match the threat by placing the blue diamond 
at a higher magnitude than the red or by accepting a greater risk by lowering the level of resource 
commitment. Additionally, setting the planning threshold at a certain point does not necessarily 
negate or ignore all threat capabilities along the higher end of the threat lines of operation 
because planners can still establish contingency plans for the emergence of a set of all of these 
less-likely, but higher magnitude, threat capabilities. In this way the planning threshold, or “blue 
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 Countering Each Threat line of Operation 
The development of individual lines of operations and specific capabilities can also be a 
method to integrate diverse capabilities and coordinated multiple organizations into a joint 
response. Planners from subordinate or outside organizations can develop independent and 
preventative lines of operation with unique and redundant capabilities assigned to counter the 
assessed threat capabilities (red lines with data points). Following any guidance on assignment of 
tasks and overall mission(s), leadership intent, and end-state objectives, planners can then 
produce their own organization’s assessment of required capabilities (blue lines with data points) 
and resources required at each blue data point. Because capability experts are asked what they 
can do to counter a specific threat capability, detection, prevention, and defensive activities can 
be integrated into a single capability package and expressed as a single capability data point 
along the appropriate friendly line of operation (i.e., collected at a single point along a “blue 
line”). However, the strength of this approach also is that each capability point can be simplified 
and expressed to senior leadership for the difficult decisions on resources and risk.    
An example of this approach is how a “blue line” could be developed against the notional 
“transnational maritime threat” line of operation. Because each of the labeled capability data 
points along the threat line of operation is a specific maritime threat scenario, homeland defense 
and homeland security planners can address each in turn to determine what their own 
organization could do to counter that individual asymmetric maritime threat aimed at the U.S. 
Homeland. For example, to counter the most-likely threat capability, planners would assess all 
possible preventative actions within their assigned area that could be used to defeat an attack by 
a single boat-bomb with limited warning. The resulting matrix of specific actions would include 
detection measures such as harbor patrol, prevention measures such as waterside obstacles and 
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heavily armed quick response force. The resources required for this capability would be 
identified, as would the warning time required to generate non-standing capabilities and the 
requirement for standing detection mechanisms to provide that warning time. While this example 
is grossly oversimplified, planners could use this approach to whatever level of detail required 
and then wargame each red capability against the proposed response to determine any shortfalls.  
This example also demonstrates the inherent flexibility and adaptability of this approach to 
planning because the discovery or suspicion of a new threat capability or the emergence of a new 
threat group with an innovative line of operation against the United States would dictate the 
addition of blue points or possibly even entire new blue lines of operation. But this could be done 
during wargaming or even during crisis action planning without disrupting the larger concept of 
operation and planning approach. Decision-makers could also remove red lines and threat 
capabilities as threats are degraded or responsibilities shift between organizations. Resetting the 
“planning threshold” for each defensive line of operation can also be adjusted based on the latest 
threat intelligence queuing and decision-makers’ judgment of the environment. This inherent 
flexibility and the cyclical nature of capabilities-based planning help integrate contingency 
planning and current operations by removing the distinction between how the two are expressed 
and assessed. 
Because each friendly capability is matrixed individually, the process of determining resource 
requirements is relatively simple yet dynamic in response to a changing environment. The 
resources needed for each individual capability along each line of operation can be added and, 
after removing possible resource duplication, the total cost in personnel, equipment, and funding 
can be easily calculated. Because each capability data point can be considered as its own 
scenario and can be made as detailed as required with specific parameters and shaping 
assumptions, the resource requirements for each can be determined by asking the simple 
question, “what type and level of resources does your organization need in order to counter this 
specific threat?” For senior decision-makers and operators alike, this establishes a key linkage 
between resources and assessed threats in a straightforward manner. 
Additionally, this process will reveal any required “enablers” (staff support tasks, standing or 
pre-designated command and control relationships, pre-approved authorities for using force, 
concept of employment for any alert forces, or coordinated surveillance tasks) needed for the 
planned capabilities (blue lines) to be executed. This can be done through internally wargaming 
the prevention plan at each capability point to determine what non-resource requirements – in 
communications, coordination, and authorities for example – were shortfalls or roadblocks to 
successful execution. This type of structured, but flexible, mini-scenario assessment and 
discussion can also facilitate coordination of which organization can most effectively deliver 
enablers and capabilities for prevention. By combining required resources with needed enablers, 
the cost of each “menu” item can be easily determined and clearly expressed as building blocks 
in capability to facilitate senior decision-makers’ assessment of where the planner threshold 
should be established. 
 
A CAPABILITIES-BASED VERSUS RESOURCES 
DECISION-MAKING APPROACH TO RISK 
While this planning process allows for the identification of resources required at each point on 
blue lines of operation to deliver the needed capabilities, setting the planning thresholds allows 
senior decision-makers to have a deliberate mechanism to allocate resources and assess risks. 
This capabilities-based planning method addresses the concerns of the current USNORTHCOM 
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combatant commander by calculating and expressing the answers to the two key decisions “what 
do these resources buy?” and “where and how much is an acceptable level of risk for this Plan?” 
As seen in Figure 11, the process of matching threat capabilities and counter capabilities 
intentionally facilitates this decision-making judgment on resources versus risks by expressing 
the “building blocks” of capabilities as requiring a set number of resources to mitigate the risk of 
the threat capability they are built to counter. When the planned (and resourced) threshold is 
placed to match the most likely assessed level of threat, that number of dedicated resources can 
be stated as counter to that level of risk, as well as less robust threat capabilities (i.e., a 
preventative capability for multiple truck bomb attacks could claim to address the threat of a 
single truck or car bomb). However, planners may recommend, and decision-makers may select, 
either to assume a greater degree of risk by moving the “Planned Capability” threshold to the left 
(only addressing lower magnitude threat capabilities) or to increase the resource commitments to 
“buy down” the risks of less-likely, but greater-magnitude threat capabilities (see Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8 
 Assessing Resource Levels and Risks 
As seen in the simple graphic above, this planning method addresses one of the major 
challenges by providing a formal mechanism to simplify complex contingency plans for 
presentation to senior decision-makers. By overlaying threat lines of operation (“Red Lines”) 
with preventative lines of operation (“Blue Lines”), this can be done without oversimplifying 
resource and risk decisions or confusing the linkage between assessed threats and planned 
counters. While the intelligence assessment will determine the most-likely threat level and the 
placement of the red diamond on a threat line of operation, this approach appropriately places the 
decision of establishing the planned capability threshold or blue diamond where it belongs: in the 
hands of senior decision-makers. But unlike more traditional approaches to homeland defense 
and homeland security planning, now this decision is better facilitated and the risk-versus-
resources trade-offs are better understood. 
This approach also can be used to identify and mitigate mismatches in capabilities. As 
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available prevention capabilities. Where no counter capabilities exist, mitigating long-term risks 
requires investment and research strategies to develop what is necessary. Once the red lines and 
blue lines are compared to determine other shortfalls, mitigation strategies can also be developed 
on short-term risks. There are three possible ways to address a capabilities mismatch: increase 
preventive capabilities (move “Blue Diamond” to the right); degrade attack threat capabilities 
(force “Red Diamond” to the left); or accept risk for threat capabilities (identified as short-term 
shortfalls). The salient point of the analysis portrayed in Figure 9 is that this approach allows for 
a method of both developing and expressing these mismatches to senior decision-makers. 
 
Figure 9 
 Determining Capabilities-Based Shortfalls 
This capabilities-based approach to planning introduces both flexibility and adaptability by 
helping planners to define a menu of required capabilities rather than numerous, individual 
solutions to narrowly-defined, highly-scripted scenarios. Capabilities-based planning treats the 
threat as a continuum, within prescribed limits, rather than as a set of single-point values. This 
highlights one weakness in the concept: a more specific intelligence warning is required to 
determine the “where” and the “when” of the threat attack and the detailed tactical planning of 
where counter-capabilities need to be executed. But modified and tailored capabilities packages 
could also provide a general deterrence value by demonstrating an ability to counter threat lines 
of operations. The end result is a comprehensive “menu” of options to prevent and defeat attacks, 
expressed as a list of potential lines of operation against the threat and a list of specific 
capabilities required to meet and overcome inherent challenges in homeland defense and security 
planning. 
 
CONCLUSION:  The Adaptability of a Capabilities-Based Contingency Methodology 
As required by the defensive mission of protecting the United States, capabilities-based threat 
assessment allows a greater focus on the “how” and not the “who” of the threat. Planners need to 
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which group actually recruited the driver or rented the truck. By using a capabilities-based 
approach to threat assessment, the question “who is the threat?” is reworded as “what could the 
threat do?” to allow exploration of a much broader range of eventualities and give homeland 
defense or homeland security planners a defined and detailed threat to plan against. This alone 
would be welcome in nearly all contingency discussions on protecting the U.S. against terrorist 
threats as a method to overcome challenges of uncertainty haunting current homeland defense 
and security planning efforts. 
One of the fundamental advantages of the capabilities-based planning process is that it is 
explicit. In expressing the threat assessment and resulting capabilities menu, the planning process 
model is rendered transparent. Assumptions and choices are tested and challenged in order to 
constantly revise, update, and improve the contingency plan. The planning process should 
integrate the needs and experience of senior decision-makers by presenting plans in a 
comprehensible format and allowing iterative involvement at every level of management and 
across different agencies and organizations. Capabilities-based planning can fulfill this 
requirement by formulating plans that can be expressed and adapted as both a menu of options 
and a rheostat of degrees of preventive response – all dictated by changes in intelligence 
warning. This approach to contingency planning exceeds the overall objective to overcome 
uncertainty with flexibility in planning.  
Capabilities-based planning can therefore be seen as a way to combine the strengths of the 
threat-based and scenario-based planning methods while maintaining the required level of 
flexibility given the evolving nature of the threat. Because of the diffuse threat environment and 
the great probability of the enemy’s use of surprise, each piece of new intelligence further refines 
what threat capabilities exist. Any “actionable intelligence” triggers the execution of pre-planned 
defense and security capabilities with required resources already identified and enabled. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described this concept well when he wrote,  
It's like dealing with burglars: You cannot possibly know who wants to break into your 
home, or when. But you do know how they might try to get in. You know they might try 
to pick your lock, so you need a good, solid, dead bolt on your front door. You know they 
might try breaking through a window, so you need a good alarm. You know it is better to 
stop them before they get in, so you need a police force to patrol the neighborhood and 




While all this may seem like common sense (as most quality planning is), a plan’s 
effectiveness is limited by how comprehensive and comprehensible the resulting plans and 
briefings are – whether the plan is to stop a burglar or terrorists. The proposed capabilities-based 
planning method accomplishes this by producing a menu of options for decision-makers that is 
directly related to specific threat capabilities and linked to specific resources. 
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Under the new “Joint Force” concept of operations model, the U.S. Navy has taken
on added prevention responsibilities that include strategic and operational responses to
asymmetric warfare. It is becoming evident that this Joint Force concept does not require
an unduly large number of operational units in order to e ectively support the nation’s ter-
rorism prevention mission. The lessons learned from the Navy’s adoption of this concept,
and its continuing evolution, are of considerable value to homeland security practitioners
who are responsible for preventing terrorist activity within their respective jurisdictions.
Communities should seek to develop surge capacity in their strategic and tactical theaters,
conducting exercises to diagnose and strengthen this critical response component. Local
organizations should consider three mission areas of prevention – interdiction, response,
and redundancy – and develop qualifiers that can be applied to evaluating these areas.
Furthermore, the Navy’s emphasis on interagency cooperation and mission interoperability
o ers an example that can be followed by local homeland security jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION 
In the years since the terrorist atrocities of September 11, 2001, the United States Navy 
has embarked on a comprehensive and innovative course of strategic and operational 
evolution designed to enhance the nation’s ability to prevent acts of terrorism.  In terms 
of its range and capabilities, the U.S. Navy has historically been one of the most versatile 
of the armed forces and its continuing transition, from its traditional blue-water mission 
of strategic deterrence to the new “Joint Force” concept of operations model dictated by 
the realities of asymmetric warfare, signifies the strategic validity of asymmetric response 
in terrorism prevention systems.1 Despite budgetary constraints, the downsizing of ship 
numbers, rapidly evolving technology, and the persistence of outmoded strategic and 
public perceptions as to the role of sea power in the 21st century, the U.S. Navy has 
successfully adopted an overarching mission of transformation – generally known as Sea 
Power 21 - that has consequently placed it in a much stronger position to operationally 
conduct terrorism prevention operations under the nation’s homeland defense and 
security mandates.2
The Navy’s dual-pronged approach to this transformational program has resulted in 
some controversial side effects (such as a reduction of the number of commissioned 
vessels necessary to achieve strategic and operational requirements) and a realignment of 
existing task force units.  Not surprisingly, some of these shifts in doctrinal and 
operational direction have sparked concern and even criticism on the part of military 
experts and naval strategists.3
But as is becoming evident, the Navy’s new Joint Force concept does not require an 
unduly large number of operational units in order to effectively support the nation’s 
terrorism prevention mission.  The key elements in terrorism prevention have been 
incorporated into the design and implementation of the Joint Force concept, and a much 
greater emphasis on mission configurability has resulted.  This, in turn, has yielded 
enhancements in efficiency and effectiveness, and the cost savings that go along with 
them.4 In 2005, the Navy possessed at least 25% more operational availability than it had 
in previous years, principally due to the provisions of the Fleet Response Plan (FRP).5
In addition to the practical value of analyzing the Navy’s transformational techniques, 
the course that the Navy has charted in order to increase its preventative effect on 
terrorism illustrates that large institutions with many sea-miles of collective experience 
and tradition to their credit can successfully undertake reform and refinement programs 
without undue damage to operational morale and effectiveness.  Indeed, the Navy’s most 
effective response to the Joint Force mandate has been one of integration, expanding its 
former role of strategic deterrence to include a form of tactical deterrence, while never 
entirely abandoning the doctrinal teachings and strategic experiences that have shaped its 
history and given it cohesiveness. 
 Because the Navy’s added prevention responsibilities now include strategic and 
operational responses to asymmetric warfare the lessons learned from its continuing 
evolution (as well as the systems, organizations and strategies employed in achieving that 
transformation) are perhaps of considerable value to similar homeland defense and 
security efforts in the nation’s civilian public safety communities, many of which operate 
in paramilitary mission areas.  Some of these lessons – such as doing more with less – are 
fairly generic occurrences in all jurisdictions, while others (like the Sea Shield mission 
area within the Sea Power 21 concept) are an adaptation of the terrorism prevention 
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paradigm that is unique to the Navy’s capabilities but which can be, in part, adapted for 
local terrorism prevention operations.   
 
THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM 
Before analyzing the Navy’s current role in terrorism prevention, a common definition of 
terrorism prevention as it exists in asymmetric strategic and tactical thought should be 
established.6 Probably the most applicable analysis of why prevention doctrine is of such 
strategic value in countering asymmetric threats is found in the work of Martha 
Crenshaw, who posits that “The decline of terrorism appears to be related to the interplay 
of three factors: the government response to terrorism (which is not restricted to 
preemption or deterrence), the strategic choices of the terrorist organization, and its 
organizational resources.”7 Crenshaw’s strategic interplay indicates that prevention 
strategies are applicable to all three factors that may deter or dissuade terrorist activity, 
and that this versatility of approach results in a unified tactical result.  In Crenshaw’s 
second and third principles, the strategic use of prevention results in tactical deployments 
that force the terrorist organization to undergo innovation; it is during and after these 
challenging periods of innovation that organizations are most likely to either abandon 
terrorist tactics, or dissolve.8
Based upon the larger strategic concerns of terrorism prevention, there are three 
specific mission areas within the homeland security matrix that address terrorism 
prevention’s tactical objectives:  Interdiction, Response and Redundancy.  These mission 
areas have been extrapolated from several homeland security documents, primarily the 
doctrinal National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism.
Interdiction can be defined as the timely application of response and support assets to 
the interruption of a terrorist organization’s objectives.  Equally well known as the 
“preemption concept,” and variously defined by the studies of Corrado and Davis (1986), 
Cillufo and Tomarchio (1998), and Rose (2000), interdiction has grown in definition and 
objective to include active response mechanisms, such as information gathering and 
intelligence analysis, and the deployment of specially trained and equipped 
counterterrorism teams.9 The National Strategy for Homeland Security stipulates the 
expansion of the interdiction discipline through the recognition that “Actionable 
intelligence is essential for preventing acts of terrorism.  The timely and thorough 
analysis and dissemination of information about terrorists and their current and potential 
activities allow the government to take immediate and near-term action to disrupt and 
prevent terrorist acts…”10 According to the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,
the, “…prevention of catastrophic terrorism is dependent upon interdiction of people and 
materials.”11 Interdiction can occur at any point in the planning and execution phases, 
and is preferably conducted during the early stages of a terrorist operation, before any 
opportunity for expansion or implementation is realized.   
Response is the ability of a jurisdiction to deploy personnel and other resources to the 
amelioration of terrorist events.  While many terrorism scholars tend to categorize 
response as a part of interdiction, (it is through response that terrorist acts are interdicted 
or thwarted) our definition of response focuses on peri- and post-event factors.  In other 
words, the speed, efficiency, and efficacy by which response assets in a particular 
jurisdiction respond to unfolding acts of terrorism essentially determines how successful 
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that event is in achieving its destructive objectives.  If, for instance, a jurisdiction were 
understaffed or under-equipped, it would be that much easier for terrorist organizations to 
exploit those weaknesses – and they can only be considered gaps – in conducting acts of 
terrorism.  In this way, rapid and effective response is a form of deterrence in that 
terrorist organizations are less likely to attack a particular locale or jurisdiction if it is 
generally known (or determined by terrorist surveillance operations) that a rapid response 
will reduce the death toll, or quickly douse the resultant fires, or repair critical 
infrastructure nodes.  The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism recognizes the 
importance of response in the prevention of terrorism by observing that, “…solid plans, 
preparations, and immediate response remain key to mitigating acts of terrorism.”12 
The third and final pillar of prevention theory – redundancy – is also the newest.  
Redundancy refers to that capability, whether on the federal, state, or local level, that 
deters or prevents attacks through the need to debilitate multiple locations or assets in 
order to achieve the terrorists’ objectives.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security 
contains extensive provisions for improving redundancy through the increased protection 
of critical infrastructure facilities.  “Protecting America’s critical infrastructure and key 
assets will not only make us more secure from terrorist attack, but will also reduce our 
vulnerability to natural disasters, organized crime, and computer hackers.”13 This 
versatility of approach is, in itself, a redundancy, and potently illustrates how vital a 
critical node the redundancy component is to the prevention strategy. 
 
THE NAVY AS A STRATEGIC DETERRENT 
The U.S. Navy’s mandate to fully participate in the prevention of terrorist attacks on the 
American homeland necessitated a rethinking and redesign of many of its principal 
strategies and tactics.  Before September 11, 2001, the U.S. Navy essentially had one 
primary mission: strategic deterrence.  Strategic deterrence theory perhaps found its most 
significant – and successful – role in the nuclear deterrence strategies of the Cold War 
(1946-1986).14 As manifested by the Cold War example, where the United States and the 
former Soviet Union stridently sought the numerical and tactical advantages inherent in 
the number of nuclear warheads and their respective destructive capabilities, the strategy 
of deterrence was most effectively realized from a position of size or strength.  Studies 
conducted by Geis and Huston (1983) on the role of bystanders as defined by the Good 
Samaritan laws in California indicate that the physical size of participants plays a 
significant role in the successful outcome of such activity.  “The important variable…was 
the size and strength of the bystander, vis à vis the victim.”15 
During the 1980’s, it was critical to the Reagan Administration’s interpretation of the 
strategic deterrence policy that the United States deploy a large navy, including a potent, 
submarine-borne ballistic missile capability.  From a conventional viewpoint, the “600-
ship Navy” served to counter the Soviet Navy’s overly-ambitious strategy of possessing 
enough warships to seize control of the world’s oceanic trade routes and thereby deny the 
use of the seas to the West.  Moreover, in a symbolic sense, a navy with a seemingly 
endless supply of ships was a swing element in the strategic deterrence concept, as it 
indicated to the USSR that the U.S. possessed the technology, industrial skill, and 
financial resources to address wide-scale conventional as well as nuclear threats.  It was, 
perhaps, this versatility of strategy and tactic that ultimately gave the deterrence policies 
of the Reagan and first Bush Administrations’ their winning edge. 
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But since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the need for 
the U.S. Navy to maintain a large, expensive and exclusive strategic deterrent has clearly 
diminished.  It is an irony of victory; by so ably winning the Cold War and removing for 
the time being any challenge to the preeminence of the U.S. in global military and 
economic affairs, the U.S. Navy essentially decommissioned not only many of its ships, 
but the very strategies that had defined its operational objectives, and even its public 
perception, since the opening days of the Cold War. 
 
THE NAVY AS TACTICAL DETERRENT 
In devising its strategy for the new century, the Navy realized that it would prove of little 
benefit to the nation’s overall security to completely abandon its strategic deterrence 
concepts – any more than it is necessary for local police departments to give up 
traditional crime fighting duties in order to effectively prevent acts of terrorism.  In 
implementing the provisions of Sea Power 21, the U.S. Navy has repeatedly signaled its 
understanding that while the strategies and tactics of naval warfare may change over 
time, the primacy of effective, mission-specific sea power remains a constant.  This 
strategic realization has permitted the Navy to adopt the Joint Force concept and evolve 
in operational dexterity by expanding its historical emphasis on strategic deterrence to 
include what can be considered a new interpretation of tactical deterrence.16 
The Navy is certainly familiar with asymmetric strategies and tactics.  In 2000, one of 
its vessels, the USS Cole (DDG 67), was the target of an asymmetric attack that left 17 
service personnel dead and an important combatant unit out of commission for several 
years.  In January 2001, the Navy released its investigation of the Cole attack, which 
noted that “the commanding officer of Cole did not have the specific intelligence, 
focused training, appropriate equipment or on-scene security support to effectively 
prevent or deter such a determined, preplanned assault on his ship.”17 Although the bulk 
of the Navy’s terrorism prevention efforts came into existence after September 11, 2001, 
the bombing of the USS Cole spearheaded a new awareness of asymmetric threats within 
the Navy hierarchy.  As early as February 2001, the Task Force on Antiterrorism and 
Force Protection, conducted under the aegis of the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), 
established the preliminary framework by which improved force protection could be 
achieved.  This program included a changing of the mindset that informed force 
protection precepts, as well as a number of asymmetrical tactic changes, including 
improved pre-deployment training, enhanced threat and situational awareness, and in-
theater support for U.S. naval vessels entering new ports.18 
To correct the vulnerabilities in organization, capabilities and tactics evidenced by the 
attack on the USS Cole, the Navy’s Sea Power 21 doctrine and its resulting Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) framework have integrated the three mission areas of terrorism 
prevention – Interdiction, Response and Redundancy – into its respective mission areas.  
As history has shown, and Sea Power 21 recognizes, naval supremacy is not principally 
achieved through superior numbers but through superior tactics, logistics, and discipline.  
In this way, Sea Power 21 provides for the preventative deployment of the very same 
asymmetric strategies and tactics that would be used by the nation’s opponents. 
It first accomplishes this by dividing its warfare capabilities into four primary tactical 
qualifiers, namely:  speed, agility, precision and persistence.  These qualifiers (which are 
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essentially evaluative in nature and fairly self-explanatory) are then applied to three 
mission areas known as “Sea Strike,” “Sea Shield,” and “Sea Basing.” 
 The first of these mission areas, “Sea Strike,” indicates that the Navy’s time-honored 
role as the nation’s first-line means of projecting strategic deterrence has not been 
omitted from the Sea Power 21 doctrine.  As its moniker indicates, Sea Strike provides 
for the projection of strategic deterrence and its influence on the prevention of terrorism 
through deterrence aimed at nation-states that serve as terrorist havens.  “Sea Strike,” Sea 
Power 21 reads, “is the ability to project precise and persistent offensive power from the 
sea.”  This “precise and persistent offensive power” has clearly been of invaluable use in 
the vast air campaigns over Afghanistan and Iraq, which were launched from U.S. Navy 
aircraft carriers.  By assisting in the removal of governments and regimes that harbor and 
provide succor to terrorist organizations, the U.S. Navy’s “Sea Strike” mission is 
providing a powerful strategic and tactical deterrent for the prevention of future terrorist 
attacks. 
 The second component in the Sea Power 21 doctrine, dubbed “Sea Shield,” is perhaps 
where the Navy’s new mission most closely adheres to the prevention of terrorist and 
other asymmetric attacks as interpreted by civilian homeland security operations.  “Sea 
Shield integrates forward-deployed naval forces with the other military services, civil 
authorities, and intelligence and law-enforcement agencies.…Homeland defense will be 
accomplished by a national effort….We will identify, track, and intercept dangers long 
before they threaten our homeland.”  The Sea Shield component also contains provisions 
for the implementation of the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) which stipulates operational 
support for the nation’s allies in detecting, disrupting and denying terrorist organizations 
– and by extension, any asymmetric opponent – the use of the world’s oceans. 
 Homeland Security’s emphasis on developing and implementing enhanced 
intelligence capabilities, which are critical to the efficacy of the Interdiction mission 
through improved situational awareness, have been included within the Sea Shield rubric.  
“Maritime patrol aircraft, ships, submarines, and unmanned vehicles will provide 
comprehensive situational awareness to cue intercepting units.”  As advocated by Sea 
Shield, situational awareness extends to the use of sophisticated equipment to nullify the 
danger of secondary or tertiary devices being deployed as part of a terrorist or 
asymmetric operation.  “When sent to investigate a suspicious vessel, boarding parties 
will use advanced equipment to detect the presence of contraband by visual, chemical, 
and radiological methods.”19 
The third of Sea Power 21’s mission areas, Sea Basing, “…enhances operational 
independence and support for the joint force.”  Primarily logistical in design and purpose, 
Sea Basing further addresses asymmetric possibilities as they pertain to communications, 
computer security, and infrastructure protection.  Since the Navy’s mission is growing 
more asymmetric in nature, it is not unrealistic or impractical to apply asymmetric 
doctrine to its tactics and strategies.  One of the most effective ways in which the Navy 
can counter asymmetric threats is therefore through redundancy, and the Sea Basing 
concept provides for surge capacity in the event major offensive or defensive activities 
are required.20 This surge capacity includes providing a sufficient degree of logistical 
support to forward-operating nodes, including up to ten aircraft carrier task forces 
simultaneously.21 The Sea Basing concept further provides for the repositioning of 
existing Navy assets, such as establishing a homeport for one of the USS Nimitz (CVN 
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68) class aircraft carriers in Hawaii or the American protectorate of Guam.  Some naval 
officials have advocated that the permanent deployment of a carrier task force in Guam 
will serve as a deterrent to terrorist activity.  “If you were a week away or two weeks 
away, that provides an opportunity to do something,” Admiral Arthur J. Johnson, 
commander of US Navy forces in the Marianas Islands, said of terrorist tactics.  “Just by 
having the capability in the neighborhood, it forces people, transnational terrorists, to 
redo their calculus.”22 
The Navy’s assumption of terrorism prevention duties under the Joint Forces precept 
has led to tangible improvements in interagency coordination and mission 
interoperability.  In the first six months of 2005 alone, the Navy conducted half a dozen 
deployments in support of the global alliance against terrorism, including participation in 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Response Force Maritime Group and 
Operation Active Endeavor, NATO’s overall response to asymmetric warfare and 
terrorist activity.  The Navy conducts similar interoperability exercises in the Pacific 
Ocean, most recently with Singapore as part of the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and 
Training (CARAT) program.  On June 6, 2005, while conducting Maritime Security 
Operations (MSO) in the Indian Ocean, the USS Gonzalez (DDG 66) thwarted an attack 
on a motor vessel by a band of pirates operating in Somalia’s littoral environment.  MSO 
“…sets the conditions for security and stability in the maritime environment and 
complements the counter-terrorism and security efforts of regional nations.  MSO denies 
international terrorists use of the maritime environment as a venue for attack or to 
transport personnel, weapons or other material.”23 As evidence of the effectiveness of the 
MSO mission area, Navy officials point to an April 2004 incident where an explosives-
laden dhow, en route to the oil terminals at Khawr Al Amaya and Al Basrah, was 
intercepted by MSO units.  Although the dhow exploded with the loss of three U.S. 
service personnel, its ultimate objective was denied, thereby preventing a much greater 
loss of life and the asymmetric destruction of a vital energy infrastructure node.24 
Clearly, mission interoperability, along with a strong naval presence, does serve to 
prevent or limit acts of asymmetric warfare and their immediate effects. 
 
NEW CAPABILITIES 
Changes in doctrine, strategy and tactics are only part of the U.S. Navy’s assumption of 
the Joint Forces paradigm.  New mission areas require new capabilities, some of which 
are organizational in direction, and some that are more resource and equipment-oriented.  
The U.S. Navy presently possesses the most sophisticated warships in existence.  The Sea 
Power 21 doctrine stipulates that it do so and the continued achievement of its Joint 
Force mission requires nothing less than full compliance.  It has been the Navy’s new 
mission of preventing and responding to asymmetric threats that has driven the 
development and construction of some of its most innovative combat units.  While these 
new vessels do possess capabilities that will allow them to fully participate in the Navy’s 
traditional strategic deterrence mission, their greatest success may be realized in an 
asymmetrical operational theater. 
In a keel-laying ceremony held in early June of 2005 at a Wisconsin shipyard, the 
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark, joined the widow of an Army 
sergeant killed in action in Iraq and posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of 
Honor, in sponsoring the newest of the U.S. Navy’s ships, the USS Freedom (LCS 1). 
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With its sleek appearance and broad operational parameters, the USS Freedom 
represents an entirely new type of vessel for the U.S. Navy - the Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS).  Measuring some 378 feet in length and displacing approximately 2,000 tons, the 
Freedom and its sister units are designed to operate at high speeds and with maximum 
maneuverability in brown-water or shallow littoral (coastal) environments.  The first new 
class of naval vessel to be introduced in over a decade, the LCS is intended to tactically 
counter a flotilla of asymmetric threats, including mines, conventional-powered 
submarines, and swift surface combatant vessels.  Each LCS will operate at speeds in 
excess of 40 knots, and can operate in drafts of less than 20 feet.  While the first 
generation LCS program calls for four units to be placed into service between 2007 and 
2009, an additional nine, second flight units are due to be commissioned between 2010-
2012.   Eventually, the U.S. Navy intends to operate up to between 60 and 100 LCSs as 
part of its ongoing transformation into a 21st century fighting force.   
But in a very real sense, the true significance of the USS Freedom lies in its name, in 
what it represents to the evolving strategies of sea power in the first half of the 21st 
century.25 Because of its unique and diverse array of capabilities, the LCS introduces 
new resources that will better enable the U.S. Navy to counter the tactics associated with 
asymmetric warfare, as well as the more traditional forms of combat at sea.  And with 
this enhanced ability comes the U.S. Navy’s freedom from many of the outmoded 
doctrinal tenants that have long typified our nation’s strategic and tactical relationship 
with sea power.   
In addition to the LCS and a new series of Mark V special operations craft, the Navy 
is constructing a new class of surface combatant called the DD(X).  Viewed as a potential 
successor to the relatively-new Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) destroyer class (to which the 
USS Gonzalez and the USS Cole belong), and bristling with technology that is adaptable 
to a future fleet of cruisers, the DD(X) will (when commissioned between 2009 and 
2011) bring new levels of asymmetric versatility to the defense of the world’s oceans.  
Fitted with an integrated all electric propulsion system, dual band radar, a peripheral 
vertical launch system, and a hull design that enhances speed and mobility, the DD(X) 
and its mission reconfigurable siblings will greatly improve the Navy’s ability to conduct 
blue and brown-water Sea Shield operations aimed at interdicting and preventing 
asymmetric attacks on the American homeland.  Additionally, it will bring greater 
precision to land warfare and the special operations that frequently accompany terrorism 
interdiction and response campaigns.26 Illustrations of the proposed DD(X) class show a 
vision of the nation’s seagoing future that looks not unlike a submarine operating on the 
surface.  It is perhaps largely symbolic in import, but it is an interesting feature of the 
DD(X) class that well over half of the vessel will exist below the waterline, hampering its 
participation in some littoral theaters, but providing for unprecedented protection while 
engaged in blue-water and anti-ship missile operations.  In what may prove an 
asymmetric defense capability of the first order, the DD(X) design permits the vessel to 
use its environment for protection and added tactical stealth.  Because these qualities are 
powerful tools in any Interdiction or Response operations, the DD(X) as conceptualized 
will serve as an effective terrorism prevention safeguard.27 
There have also been several calls for a renewal of the Navy’s conventional-powered 
submarine building program, with the intent that these vessels would prove an effective 
counter to asymmetric attacks launched from quiet-operating submarines.  So far the 
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Navy has resisted this, most probably because anti-submarine warfare operations can be 
more effectively addressed by the LCS and DD(X) concepts.28 
CONCLUSIONS 
The U.S. Navy’s experience in adopting its most recent program of transformation 
contains a number of lessons for homeland security practitioners who are responsible for 
preventing terrorist activity within their respective jurisdictions.   
The development of new mission areas within the Navy has indicated the importance 
of obtaining and deploying equipment that can in fact support these mission areas.  While 
it is true that the U.S. Navy possesses considerable resources, these are proportionally no 
greater in relation to its evolving mission than they would be for state and local 
jurisdictions with more finite terrorism prevention responsibilities.  Where the Navy has 
been successful in this regard is in avoiding the tendency to allow strategies, rather than 
more specific tactical objectives, to determine operational and equipment needs.   
The Navy’s experience has also shown that communities should seek to develop 
surge capacity in their strategic and tactical theaters, and conduct exercises to diagnose 
and strengthen this critical response component.  The Navy’s Fleet Response Plan (FRP) 
is a sound conceptual model that state and local jurisdictions can adopt for their own 
homeland security surge requirements.  As the Navy has evidenced, surge capacity is an 
important tactic in asymmetric operations, be they part of a larger military action or taken 
in response to an event on the state and local levels.  Its ability to double capacity for 
short periods of time (in what the FRP refers to as the “emergency surge” response level) 
establishes a benchmark standard which organizations with similar homeland security 
and public safety responsibilities can augment.29 
When developing strategic and tactical programs, local organizations should consider 
the three mission areas of prevention, and develop evaluative qualifiers that can be 
applied to the Interdiction, Response, and Redundancy mission areas.  Sea Power 21 
stipulates four operational qualifiers - speed, agility, precision and persistence – while 
other applicable qualifiers might include timing, diligence, organization, and diversity.30 
Like the Navy, jurisdictions and organizations that adopt evaluative criteria or standards 
will find it easier to define and refine their terrorism prevention strategies and tactics. 
The Navy’s emphasis on interagency cooperation and mission interoperability is 
another example that can be followed by local homeland security jurisdictions.  In 
addition to drills and exercises designed to familiarize players with equipment 
capabilities and operating protocols, the Navy’s Maritime Security Operations (MSO) 
program enhances the nation’s asymmetric response capabilities by forging a working 
coalition between the Navy and its maritime partners.  According to Vice Admiral David 
Nichols, who coordinates U.S. maritime security operations in the international waters of 
the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean theater, “Pressurizing the maritime environment describes 
an effect…which deters the terrorists from using the maritime environment.…We do that 
via integrated operations amongst a coalition force of several nations across the entire 
region inside and outside the Gulf.”31 
Adapting this kind of interoperability at the local level should strengthen efforts to 
prevent terrorism.  First, a unified effort signals deterrence, and makes it much harder for 
asymmetric operations to be planned and implemented.  Second, the interoperability 
model requires that personnel and their core capabilities from several different 
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departments, and even nations, become actual stakeholders in the strategic and tactical 
objectives that constitute interoperability.  Among other benefits, the practice raises 
morale which, in increasing warrior proficiency through the Navy’s mission area 
qualifiers of speed, agility, precision and persistence, enhances the Navy’s ability to deter 
and prevent acts of terrorism.  At a time when communities around the U.S. are 
implementing the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the Navy’s system for 
achieving interagency operability while maintaining unit independence and readiness 
stands as a workable model and reference point. 
As it has been for the Homeland Defense and Security community, the Navy’s 
doctrinal and operational shift toward preventing acts of asymmetric warfare has been set 
against the backdrop of a rapidly changing global power dynamic.  In addition to the 
transnational asymmetric threats posed by terrorist organizations, China, in particular, 
figures prominently in many of the Navy’s scenarios, and contemporary observers of sea 
power have been quick to note this strategic sea change.32 While Sea Power 21’s concept 
of operations emphasizes the importance of an asymmetric response to asymmetric 
threats, the Navy’s traditional role of strategic deterrence against nation-states that seek 
to employ asymmetric strategies and tactics has not been ignored.   
Indeed, the Navy’s adoption of the Joint Forces doctrine has in part been aided by 
China’s strategic and tactical reliance on the tenants of asymmetric warfare to determine 
its shipbuilding priorities.  China’s recent escalation of its naval capabilities program has 
largely been inspired by its determination to deter moves by the Taiwanese to seek 
independence and to tactically counter any military intervention on the part of Taiwan or 
the United States.  When one considers the type of vessels the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is presently placing into service, it would appear that a 
guerre de course – a war of trade - is not its primary concern at this time.  It is building 
these specialized vessels with specific operational parameters in mind, namely that of 
deterring U.S. military support for Taiwan.33 The United States is not alone in making 
preparations to counter China’s burgeoning emphasis on asymmetric sea combat.  Taiwan 
itself has undertaken a rapid reconfiguration of its military infrastructure, including the 
acquisition of destroyers, diesel-electric attack submarines, and aircraft, which will reach 
its apogee within the next decade.  Known as the “offshore defense strategy,” Taiwan’s 
intention is to develop an effective military deterrent to a Chinese invasion, with 
particular emphasis on deterring activity in the Taiwan straits.34 
The U.S. Navy must continue to maintain a strident level of strategic deterrence in 
order to maintain the present balance of power in eastern Asia.  At first glance this might 
seem more of a tactical imperative, except that in doing so, the Navy is in fact acting in 
the role of a strategic deterrent to a potential rise in domestic terrorism.  A survey of 
terrorist-related events indicates that as empires and nations undergo periods of economic 
contraction, incidences of terrorist activity tend to increase.  There are several reasons for 
this relationship, among them the perception that economic decline translates into an 
inability to adequately project the military and economic power necessary to deter or 
prevent acts of terrorism.  In the years following the First World War, Great Britain saw 
both its economic and military primacy over the world’s affairs markedly reduced.  Once 
this perception became widespread, numerous instances of terrorist activity – particularly 
on the part of Irish nationalists – occurred.  A similar series of events has been witnessed 
in several of the republics that formerly comprised the Soviet Union.  Once the 
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cohesiveness of the Soviet empire was lost, acts of asymmetric warfare occurred in 
several republics. 
At the present time, with the U.S. maintaining its economic and military primacy, acts 
of terrorism against its domestic and international interests do occur, but not with the 
frequency that historical data indicates could be possible were the nation to economically 
and militarily weaken.  For nations and societies, the future is often a pathway that winds 
through darkness and uncertainty, and the American eagle is not without potential 
challengers to its economic and military supremacy – including one increasingly 
acquisitive dragon.  By maintaining strategic deterrence through tactical deterrence, the 
U.S. Navy continues to play a pivotal role in preventing acts of terrorism by protecting 
the framework by which U.S. economic and military dominance can be sustained.   
While at the present time the U.S. Navy does have many operational missions, 
ranging from strategic deterrence and amphibious operations to logistical support and 
Homeland Security duties, its most important mission continues to be that of strategic and 
tactical evolution.  As the Chief of Naval Operations wrote in his 2005 Guidance, 
“Transforming ourselves and our great institution for the dangerous decades ahead is our 
imperative.”35 
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How do we know if prevention is working? Not only is the measurement of prevention
activities possible, the methodologies of “how” to measure already exist in numerous
processes. Additionally, the definitions of “what” to measure have been both experienced
and discussed. This article argues that measuring prevention can be accomplished by
examining and evaluating the pieces that make up the whole and demonstrates that not
only is prevention measurable, that measurement is well within our reach. Measuring
e ectiveness is not always done at the level of final outcomes. Often, the processes and
systems (or outputs) that lead to preferred outcomes are measured when ultimate outcome
measurement is impossible. To increase our understanding of how to combat terrorism,
we need to put the argument of immeasurable prevention behind us and accept that
prevention can be quantified, at least by evaluating the parts of the whole.
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INTRODUCTION 
How do we know if prevention is working? How do we know if all the efforts and 
resources directed towards stopping the next attack are worthwhile? How do we measure 
a negative? How do we continue to justify the diversion of public funds from other 
essential services if our only justification for success will be “nothing happened?” If we 
could count how many attacks were stopped or deterred, measuring prevention would 
obviously be a simple task and this article would be superfluous. Unfortunately, inherent 
in an ability to count what the enemy has decided not to do requires an ability to read the 
minds of our foes or, at the very least, an ability to constantly observe their internal 
decision cycles. Even if the absence of an attack were not the result of a conscious 
decision by the terrorist, but rather the result of some unfortunate (from their point of 
view) circumstance, our ability to quantify the elimination of the threat would require a 
much deeper intelligence capability than we are able to construct.  If we could peer so 
deeply into the opposition that we could count each of their failures, this same capability 
would also make the entire homeland security enterprise moot. 
 The ability to measure the prevention of terrorist attacks is vitally important for a 
number of reasons. First, there is the accountability issue. The nation, at all levels of 
government and the private sector, is investing vast amounts of funds and efforts to 
“prevent the next attack.” Not only that, we have reorganized significant portions of the 
federal government (and some states as well) to protect our citizens, economy, 
infrastructure and way of life from another horrendous attack upon the homeland. How 
do we know we are succeeding? What type of examination tells us we have been wise in 
our investments, or have we been lucky in spite of them? Secondly, we need to 
effectively guide, and justify, future investments. Without a rational argument and 
measurement process to explain the benefits of expenditures on prevention activities, we 
are not only apt to suffer deserved criticism; we also risk sacrificing future investments, 
political credibility and the public’s faith. Third, and most importantly, how can we claim 
to be effectively protecting the safety and security of the nation without any way of 
determining whether our path and efforts are, at the least, mostly correct and rational? 
 This is critical.  In the absence of more attacks (and this is a good thing), we are in 
effect asking the public and appropriators to “trust us” on our near and long term efforts 
to prevent terrorist attacks. How long will this trust last? Is it already waning? How long 
can we justify expenditures on this particular public good versus all the others? On the 
other hand, should another attack occur we will once again dissect every effort we made 
to prevent it.  How will our response to the investigation be viewed if our efforts are 
based upon unmeasured, unguided and illogically resourced actions to prevent the 
tragedy in the first place? 
 Now the good news: not only is the measurement of prevention activities possible, the 
methodologies of “how” to measure already exist in numerous processes. Additionally, 
the definitions of “what” to measure have been both experienced and discussed. This 
article will argue that measuring prevention can be accomplished by examining and 
evaluating the pieces that make up the whole and demonstrate that not only is prevention 
measurable, that measurement is well within our reach. I will support this argument by 
discussing and justifying the concept behind process measurement; by briefly examining 
some current thoughts of what might comprise prevention; and then by proposing and 
testing one methodological possibility. 
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PROCESS MEASUREMENT 
We are not at the place where we can declare a victory of intelligence. Nor should we be 
so shortsighted that we are willing to continue a massive investment in preventive action 
without a means to measure whether it is at all effective. But, to argue against the 
counting negatives parable, measuring effectiveness is not always done at the level of 
final outcomes. Often, the processes and systems that lead to preferred outcomes are 
measured when ultimate outcome measurement is impossible. Emergency management 
agencies are not (usually) measured by how many houses are or are not flooded in a 
storm event; rather, the systems and programs that help prevent flooding are measured 
against accepted standards of practice
1
. Fire agencies are not generally measured by how 
many houses are saved or burn; their response times are measured to quantify and 
compare increased/decreased efficiency versus the inputs they invest. We may not know 
"how many shipwrecks does a lighthouse prevent?”
2
but we can evaluate the design and 
decision processes that lead to the specific placement of lighthouses and come to some 
conclusion as to the soundness of these decisions without knowing whether ships did or 
did not crash because of them. 
 Why can't prevention efforts, especially at the state and local levels, be evaluated in a 
similar fashion? We can set in place sound and reasoned prevention practices and 
standards that we can confidently conclude will lead to the prevention of terrorist attacks. 
These practices and/or approaches can then be measured in pieces or comprehensively to 
give some sense of a program’s effectiveness. For example, if it is accepted that a critical 
piece of the prevention process is the establishment of a collaborative system that enables 
and promotes the integration and analysis of data from all sources (from both inside and 
outside the law enforcement community) – which in turn better guides protection 
measure decisions – then the existence or nonexistence of this system is a measurement. 
If it does not exist, one could reasonably postulate that prevention is weaker. If we took 
all the pieces of one simplified prevention process (threat identification, target evaluation, 
risk assessment, or response/protection decisions) and detailed the sub-components of the 
process, we could ideally come up with a systematic approach in which many of the 
individual pieces of the overall process could be measured. If all, or most, of the pieces 
are effective, then the whole might be effective. This of course assumes that whatever 
model process we propose actually portrays a sound and reasoned approach that, when 
employed, leads to better prevention. 
 The Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Domestic Preparedness proposes a 
prevention process model in their Prevention Guidelines for Homeland Security
3
that 
could be used to describe both the process to be assessed as well as up to 165 individual 
tasks and/or outputs. The National Preparedness Guidance
4
takes the guidelines’ model 
further and identifies a list of target capabilities that are desired for the entire spectrum of 
the homeland security effort from prevention to recovery, as well as some common cross-
cutting capabilities required in all mission areas.  
 Specifically, this guidance identifies the prevention and protection target capabilities, 
or “things we should be able to do well,
5
” as follows:  
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Prevention Mission Area: Information Collection and Threat Detection, Intelligence 
Fusion and Analysis, Information Sharing and Collaboration, Terrorism Investigation and 
Apprehension, and CBRNE Detection;  
Protection Mission Area: Risk Analysis, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
Food/Agriculture Safety and Defense, Public Health Epidemiological Investigation and 
Testing, and Citizen Preparedness and Participation. 
 For discussion purposes, all the processes and elements mentioned above might be 
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There are arguably (and it will be argued) many ways to portray all the possible 
prevention components and tasks in a succinct and simple diagram. The point here is not 
so much how the final, best model process could best be visually depicted; it is how such 
a reasonably sound process could be measured by component, task, and/or output. 
 
DEFINING THE PIECES OF THE PROCESS:  OUTCOMES TO OUTPUTS 
What are outcomes? Harry P. Hatry defines them, as “events, occurrences or changes in 
conditions, behavior, or attitudes that indicate progress toward achievement of the 
mission and objectives of the program. Thus outcomes are linked to the program’s (and 
its agency’s) overall mission – its reason for existing, [emphasis added].”
7
When 
considering the establishment of any organized structure for prevention, the immediate 
step after determining its mission or objective should be the establishment of measurable 
outcomes that will help focus efforts to advance that mission. The General Accounting 
Office in April of 2002 testified to the Senate Committee on Government Affairs that two 
key ingredients were missing from then current strategic efforts towards combating 
terrorism: the lack of measurable outcomes and the lack of the identification of 
appropriate roles for state and local governments.
8
This testimony occurred prior to the 
publication of the National Strategy for Homeland Security in June 2002 and its impact 
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on the authors of the strategy is unknown. Can measurable and achievable prevention 
outcomes be developed? 
 From the example process above, it is possible to rephrase the four major elements 
into four measurable desired outcomes or goals for an organizational effort to prevent 
terrorist attacks: 1) the increased ability to identify indications of an existing or future 
threat; 2) the increased ability to evaluate the potential of threats as they are identified; 3) 
the reduced vulnerability of critical infrastructures and other potential targets; and 4) the 
increased appropriateness of protection and/or other threat response activities. 
 Together, these four outcomes describe elements of a risk assessment process that 
could ultimately provide policy makers and executive decision authorities an objective 
cost-benefit analysis that will help guide their final actions in response to identified 
terrorist threats. 
 Taking it one step further, outputs could also be proposed for measuring each of the 
desired outcomes. Clearly the list of outputs for the prevention of terrorism could draw 
from hundreds of potential courses of action. But some of the “highest order” outputs 
could provide a starting point for organized actions. At this level of detail, it is important 
to note that what might comprise prevention on an international, foreign policy scale is 
unlikely to be the same as that for state and local governments or the private sector. For 
the four prevention outcomes identified above, I propose thirteen individual outputs that 
might be applied in a domestic stetting: 
Outputs for Outcome One, the increased ability to identify indications of an existing 
or future threat: 1) development of a strategy and commensurate business plans that 
describe how to assure the collaboration and coordination amongst all entities that 
participate in the threat identification processes; 2) creation and implementation of a 
system to collect, screen and store relevant information with investigative value
9
; and 3) 
development of a training system that provides adequate basic level threat awareness 
education to all public service entities, the private sector, and the general public as 
appropriate.  
Outputs for Outcome Two, the increased ability to evaluate the potential of threats 
as they are identified: 1) adoption or development of an appropriate analytical model to 
assess threat indications; 2) ensured collaboration and integration of assessment and 
evaluation processes from traditional as well as non-traditional investigative entities, (e.g. 
health and agricultural agencies); 3) creation and/or assignment of a lead organization to 
oversee and coordinate a system of threat identification and assessment processes; and 4) 
through policy, legislative and/or executive action, the identification and development of 
strategies to overcome barriers to the appropriate sharing of information and intelligence 
products. 
Outputs for Outcome Three, reduced vulnerability of critical infrastructures and 
other potential targets: 1) assignment or creation of a lead entity to oversee the effort to 
identify, assess vulnerabilities of, analyze consequences, and recommend protective 
strategies and priorities of critical infrastructures and potential targets of terrorists; 2) 
development and oversight of strategies and action plans that maximize the collaboration 
and coordination of the owners of potential targets and the entity’s effort to reduce their 
vulnerabilities; and 3) provision of a leadership point to assure the coordination between 
private, local, state, and federal critical infrastructure protection efforts. 
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Outputs for Outcome Four, increased appropriateness of protection and/or other 
threat response activities: 1) establishment and oversight of a process that ensures the 
interconnection of the first three outcomes and results in recommendations for protection 
decisions and threat response measures; 2) development of a risk management or cost 
benefit tool that will guide appropriate protection and response action decisions; and 3) 
development of a methodology that delineates responsibilities for varying degrees of 
decision-making amongst and between levels of government and the private sector. 
 These outputs and objectives could be modified, added to, or otherwise changed to 
better reflect the needs and expectations of individual government or private sector 
entities. The important and critical assumption is that should all of these elements be 
implemented effectively, it will help lead to the prevention of terrorist attacks, and 
therefore the evaluation of these outputs will provide a viable measurement tool. The 
emphasis again is measuring a logical and reasonable process that would, by its 
implementation, lead to better prevention. This approach does not attempt to measure 
prevention through the accounting of non-attacks which, as stated earlier, is either 
impossible or at least not quantifiably consistent. One way to analyze the validity of the 
proposed outcomes and outputs is to ask the negative of each of the elements. In other 
words, if these four outcomes and thirteen outputs were not in place, could we reasonably 
assume that the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack is greater? Without these 
elements in place, the leaders of an organizational effort to prevent terrorism would have 
no systems or processes by which to identify the threats, to analyze and evaluate 
probabilities, to prioritize potential targets for protection or to make good risk 
management decisions about what actions to take in a threat environment. If this were the 
case, I would measure this particular entity’s overall ability to prevent a terrorist attack as 
extremely low. They would have to instead rely upon luck, or on the decision of the 
enemy not to attack them for some other rationale unknown to the defending 
organization. 
 
A MEASUREMENT EXAMPLE 
There are numerous applications and methodologies for converting desired outcomes and 
outputs to measurement language. Examples of measurement methodologies include 
everything from an exhaustive process involving the assignment of values or weights to 
each element and its detailed tasks, to a simpler exercise in which one might use stop 
light colors for each element; (e.g. “red” means no effort or system in place to achieve the 
output or outcome, “yellow” indicates some efforts are underway or partially completed, 
and “green” designates completion or sustained efforts in effect).  Finding the “how” to 
measure is the easy part. There are any number of models to use and hundreds of expert 
consultants, contractors and academics ready to engage in methods for measurement. 
Defining the “what” to measure is where we are challenged. 
 For a brief illustrative example that applies one method for “how” to measure the 
“what” I am proposing, I have used outcome number Two: Increased ability to evaluate 
the potential of threats as they are identified. Applying a simple numerical weighting 
system to the outputs, each has been graded according to the following scale and criteria. 
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0 = No effort or system underway nor recognition of the need 
 1 = Recognition of the need but no effort or resources to accomplish the output 
 2 = Initial efforts and resources underway to achieve the output 
 3 = Moderate progress towards accomplishing the output 
 4 = Sustained efforts underway and output near to fulfillment 
 5 = Output achieved and resources devoted to sustain the effort 
For this example, I have assigned a numerical assessment to each of the outputs and 
provided a fictional, but plausible, narrative of that evaluation.  
 
Measurement of Outcome Two  
(Increased ability to evaluate the potential of threats as they are identified) 
 
Measurement of 2-1 
Adoption or development of an appropriate analytical model to assess threat indications.  
Score = 2 
Through the intended, financed and planned, yet to be implemented, establishment of a 
state fusion center, it is expected that an analytical model will be utilized based upon 
national best practices or customized design.  
Measurement of 2-2
Ensured collaboration and integration of assessment and evaluation processes from 
traditional as well as non-traditional investigative entities, (e.g. health and agricultural 
agencies.) 
Score = 2.5 
While the formal fusion center and system is yet to be established, all law enforcement 
agencies and non-law enforcement entities have recognized the requirement to participate 
in the sharing and dissemination of information and intelligence. Staff have been 
identified and protocols have been established to transfer threat and vulnerability related 
data and to participate in evaluation of such data in a collaborative fashion. 
 
Measurement of 2-3
Creation and/or assignment of a lead organization to oversee and coordinate a system of 
threat identification and assessment processes. 
Score = 4 
The state patrol’s intelligence division has been assigned lead responsibility for the 
achievement of this objective. It has been resourced by both state and federal funds and 
its efforts are monitored and accountable to the Governor, the state patrol chief and the 
homeland security director. Long term strategic planning and budgeting efforts have been 
completed and approved, in concept, by the state legislature. 
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Measurement of 2-4
Through policy, legislative and/or executive action, identification and development of 
strategies to overcome barriers to the appropriate sharing of information and intelligence 
products. 
Score = 2.5 
While much discussion and some action has overcome and/or satisfied some privacy act 
and civil liberty issues, much work remains to be done; specifically, in the issue area of 
the sharing and protection of data shared between the public and private sectors. 
 Out of a possible “score” of 20 for objective Two, this fictional entity measures 11 
(the total of the four scored outputs). So one might say that this entity’s “increased ability 
to evaluate threats as they are identified” is not yet realized but is progressing. Therefore, 
in combination with the other three prevention objectives, the executives could 
reasonably assess their overall prevention efforts, at least at a strategic level. While as 
much subjectivity as possible can be taken out of this process through firmer scoring 
criteria, the question of whether this objective or its outputs are important to overall 
prevention will most likely be a subjective decision by the senior officials responsible. 
But this simple evaluation can at least paint a picture of the level of progress in this 
element from which further resource, executive guidance, or prioritization can be 
accomplished. The score may be acceptable at this point in time and the executive 
directive is to continue as planned. Or the assessment may be judged to be woefully 
inadequate and the timeframe for the establishment of a fusion center is accelerated. 
 As stated before, there are many variations and available tools to measure objectives 
and outputs. Additionally, what is deemed important to be measured could deviate or 
adjust from the proposed tool presented here and the outputs could be expanded and 
examined at a greater level of detail. The key question again is if, by measuring the 
pieces of a logical approach that can be reasonably expected to lead to better prevention, 
can overall prevention itself be measured and evaluated?  If (as this article suggests) the 
answer is yes, then not only can investments and efforts be more logically and justifiably 
applied, the public good is better served by measured and guided efforts that actually lead 
to the intended result. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As proposed in the introduction, this concept of measurement by process effectiveness is 
not ground-breaking.  The public health community proposed this approach for their 
evaluation of efforts to combat bio-terrorism and other catastrophic threats
10
. Their effort 
was comprised of two major objectives. One, to measure the ability of the public health 
community to respond to all events – not just bio-terrorism – by measuring its 
preparedness for other threats such as West Nile Virus, SARS and an influenza season; 
and two, to measure such preparedness by evaluating the pieces (e.g. an epidemiological 
surveillance capacity,) of the overall processes which, when working in concert, are 
designed to achieve an effective prevention and response capability. 
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There are also other potentials for measurement, not discussed in this article, 
involving the measurement of other consequences of those systems primarily designed 
for counter-terrorism. For example, if the systems and actions to better share law 
enforcement threat data to identify potential terrorists also serve to increase the ability to 
identify and capture non-terrorist criminals, then the increase/decrease of common 
criminals identified could indicate measurement of the overall system as well. While the 
examples presented above are over-simplified, they demonstrate the enormous potential 
and opportunities to measure prevention without having to rely on “what did not happen.” 
 This article is written in the middle of the year 2005, a time when the congress, state 
and local governments, and their executing agencies are all focusing on the homeland 
security funding questions of “how much?” and “how will we know when it is enough?” 
For some mission areas, measurement will be easy.  Consequently, the policy debates 
over what capability gaps to “buy,” will be less esoteric. The gap between not enough 
communications gear and almost enough will be much simpler to quantify than the one 
between the unknown amount of prevention we possess and the near to perfect results we 
demand, but cannot define. But if we do nothing else, we need to put the argument of un-
measurable prevention behind us and accept that it can be quantified, at least by proxy 
and/or by evaluating the parts of the whole. Oddly, considering the purpose of this article, 
the near-term challenge we face is not the establishment and acceptance of a system that 
depicts prevention in measurable outcomes and outputs.  The real challenge will be to 
avoid the temptation to only resource those missions we already understand versus those 
of vastly more importance that we are just learning to build. 
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